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CODING OVER THE CRACKS:  
PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS AND CHILD 
PROTECTION 
 
Stephanie K. Glaberson* 
ABSTRACT 
Across the nation, child protective authorities are turning to 
machines to assist them in their work, developing predictive analytic 
tools to forecast risk to children and families.  While there is clear 
evidence that current child welfare decision-making processes are 
flawed and in need of change, the advent of predictive analytics 
carries with it numerous risks to children and families that cannot be 
ignored.  This Article explains the fundamentally human processes 
that go into the creation of predictive analytic tools and highlights 
some of the risks that these tools pose.  It argues that the choices 
made in developing predictive tools implicate some of the most 
fundamental and as-yet unanswered questions in our child welfare 
system.  As a result, the advent of predictive analytics in child welfare 
presents a moment for systemic reflection.  Without careful attention 
to the issues that predictive analytics raise, communities risk simply 
coding over the cracks in the foundation of a flawed system, burying 
problems of bias, transparency, and accountability deeper, and 
imbuing the status quo with an undue patina of inevitability.  Instead, 
communities should use this moment to demand more of their child 
welfare systems and see these tools as opportunities to build better, 
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the ideas included in this piece and encouraged me along the way, including Eduardo 
Ortiz, David C. Vladeck, Paul Ohm, Deborah Epstein, Nila Natarajan, Molly Ryan, 
Kelly Capatosto, Lucas Merrill Brown, Froilan Irizarry, Sean Hill, Aubrey Rose, 
Michele Gilman, Shanta Trivedi, the participants in the Family Law: Children’s 
Welfare group at the 2018 Clinical Law Review Writer’s Workshop at New York 
University School of Law, my colleagues in the 2017–19 class of clinical teaching 
fellows at GULC, and the editors at the Fordham Urban Law Journal.  All errors are 
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more humane systems that focus more on support and prevention and 
less on too-little, too-late crisis response. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Child welfare authorities across the nation are engaged in a high-
stakes project every day: they must predict which children might be at 
risk of harm in their homes, and whether and when authorities can, or 
should, intervene.  Erroneous predictions carry grave consequences.  
Agency failures to intervene that result in harm to children at the 
hands of their caregivers are highly publicized.1  Less publicized, but 
equally grave and much more common, are harms that result from 
unnecessary agency interventions, both those that separate children 
from their families and those that do not, each of which risks inflicting 
lifelong trauma.2  This risk-prediction project relies heavily on human 
decision-makers, who often handle crushing caseloads under high 
stress, with little training, limited time, and imperfect information.  
Bias inevitably creeps into these vital human-powered decisions, 
resulting disproportionately in the breakup of poor families and 
families of color.3 
In this age of automation and artificial intelligence, a tempting new 
prospect has emerged: using the “magic” of predictive analytics to 
forecast whether and when children need the government to 
intervene.  Algorithmic prediction systems already are impacting 
many areas of life, from employment, to college admissions, to tax 
audits, to the criminal justice system.4  State and local governments 
are using algorithmic models to attempt to predict future 
dangerousness of alleged offenders in setting terms of release or bail, 
to forecast likely recidivism through sentencing prediction tools, and 
to project likely probation violations.5  Additionally, law enforcement 
agencies nationwide are attempting to use “predictive policing” to 
 
 1. See infra Section I.B.3. 
 2. The recent uproar over the Trump Administration’s separation of immigrant 
families has brought with it a rare but welcome spotlight on the harms of unnecessary 
family separation.  The traumatic effects of even short stays in foster care have been 
well documented.  See Vivek S. Sankaran & Christopher Church, Easy Come, Easy 
Go: The Plight of Children Who Spend Less than Thirty Days in Foster Care, 19 U. 
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 207, 210–13 (2017).  Even unnecessary investigations that do 
not result in family separation can be traumatic. See infra notes 178–83 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 4. See Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty and Big Data: A Matrix of 
Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53 (2017). 
 5. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1109, 1113–14 (2017). 
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“stop[] crime before it happens,” modeling not only where and how 
to allocate resources, but increasingly who to police.6 
Child protective authorities are now dipping their toes into these 
waters as well.  Agencies are building and deploying tools that pull 
together vast quantities of data stored by various government entities, 
and return a “risk score” purporting to predict the likelihood of child 
maltreatment.7  When constructing these predictive tools, developers 
must make myriad complex, value-laden, and ultimately human 
decisions that touch on some of the most fundamental — and 
unanswered — questions in child welfare policy.8  These questions 
range from how to define child maltreatment, to how much risk we 
are willing to tolerate, to how we value different types of error, to 
how we address bias and disproportionality in child welfare practices.  
As Cathy O’Neil, author of Weapons of Math Destruction, wrote, 
“models are opinions embedded in mathematics.”9 
This Article argues that the advent of predictive analytics risks 
simply coding over the cracks in the foundation of our child welfare 
system.  Unless careful attention is paid to the assumptions, biases, 
and realities of our child welfare system at this critical juncture, 
algorithmic decision-making risks perpetuating and magnifying 
existing problems.  The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I 
describes the “decision points” that a child welfare agency encounters 
as a child or family moves through the system.  It considers the 
evidence showing that this human-based decision-making system is 
deeply flawed.  Part II defines predictive analytics and explains the 
fundamentally human process of developing a machine learning 
algorithm.  This Part also identifies those jurisdictions that are 
implementing or considering instituting predictive risk tools, 
highlighting those developed by Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and 
the Florida non-profit, Eckerd Kids.  Part III analyzes the risks posed 
by predictive analytics as they are introduced into child protective 
decision-making.  It addresses the ways in which predictive analytics 
can introduce error into decisions, further embed old prejudices and 
biases into new systems, and generate new risks for children and 
families.  Finally, acknowledging that predictive analytics already are 
 
 6. Id. at 1112. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Section II.A. 
 9. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA 
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (Reprint ed. 2017).  Cathy 
O’Neil is a mathematician and former Wall Street “quant.”  She is now the founder 
of ORCAA, an algorithmic auditing company. 
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taking hold, Part IV provides some preliminary recommendations for 
ways in which advocates, scholars, and officials can attempt to ensure 
that any predictive tools employed where they work and live are 
developed responsibly and in line with community values. 
I. CHILD PROTECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 
To assess the role predictive analytics may play in child welfare, 
and the risks and benefits such tools offer, it is important to review 
the decisions that child welfare authorities are called upon to make in 
the course of a child protective case.  This Part first will provide an 
overview of the various “decision points” that occur throughout a 
child protective case.  It then will discuss the methods agencies 
generally use to arrive at decisions and conclude by reviewing the 
evidence that the current system of decision-making is flawed and 
must be improved.10 
A. Decision Points in a Child Protective Case 
As children and their families move through the child protective 
system, moments arise when individuals, agencies, and courts are 
called upon to make vital decisions.  Oft-discussed examples include 
whether to report suspected maltreatment or whether a child should 
be removed from or returned to his or her home, but there are a 
multitude of other decisions made along the way.  This Article refers 
to each of these moments as “decision points.”11  At each of these 
points, the quality of the decision may have grave consequences for 
the life of the child or family. 
In most instances, child welfare authorities begin their involvement 
in the life of a family when someone makes a phone call to report 
suspected abuse or neglect to state authorities.12  The decision 
whether to report, therefore, is the first decision point in the process.  
 
 10. See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1045 
(2017) (“When we appraise emerging technologies, we must be careful not to 
romanticize a pretechnological past.  New technologies must be examined both in 
comparison to their less-technological alternatives and in the context of the world 
that we now inhabit.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Marian S. Harris & Wanda Hackett, Decision Points in Child 
Welfare: An Action Research Model to Address Disproportionality, 30 CHILD. & 
YOUTH SERV. REV. 199 (2008). 
 12. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)(b)(2)(i); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §17a-103a 
(2016); FL. ST. ANN. § 39.201(2)(b) (West 2016); IND. C. 31-33-7-3; IOWA C. ANN. § 
232.70 (2016); VERNON’S ANN. MISS. STAT. §210.145 (2018); N.Y. SOC. SERV. L. § 
422(2)(a) (2018); 10A OK. STAT. T. 10A § 1-2-101(A)(1) (2018). 
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Many states permit community reporters to remain anonymous.13  
State law often mandates that professionals who work closely with 
children and families, like teachers, social workers, and doctors, must 
report child abuse or neglect if they become aware of it.14  In many 
places, the laws obligating mandated reporters to take action are 
vague and quite broad.15 
Regardless of whether a mandated reporter or some other 
individual places the call, it goes to the same place: a centralized call 
center,16 where a hotline worker screens the call.17  This brings us to 
the second decision point: the call screener must decide whether the 
allegations of abuse or neglect warrant an investigation.  Call 
screeners usually have latitude to “screen in” the call, meaning to 
forward it to a local child protective office for investigation, to simply 
take note of the call and add it to a central file kept on the child or 
family, or to reject the call altogether.18 
 
 13. See Dale Margolin Cecka, Abolish Anonymous Reporting to Child Abuse 
Hotlines, 64 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 51, 54–55 (2015) [hereinafter Cecka, Abolish 
Anonymous Reporting].  For years, advocates have called for an end to anonymous 
reporting, arguing that it allows bad actors to “weaponize” child protective 
authorities and does not improve children’s safety. See, e.g., id.; see also Dale 
Margolin Cecka, How Child Abuse Hotlines Hurt the Very Children They’re Trying 
to Protect, WASH. POST (May 6, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/06/how-child-abuse-
hotlines-hurt-the-very-children-theyre-trying-to-protect/?utm_term=.62170e567bbe 
[https://perma.cc/H9YF-Q82J]; Richard Wexler, Why It’s So Easy to Troll Someone 
with Anonymous Child Abuse Report, YOUTH TODAY (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://youthtoday.org/2018/08/why-its-so-easy-to-troll-someone-with-anonymous-
child-abuse-report/ [https://perma.cc/HNU2-GG8E]. 
 14. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2015); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 39.201 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (West 2018); LA. CHILD. 
CODE ANN. art. 603(17) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 21 (West 2018); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (West 2018); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 
2018); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-3 (West 2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-
6.1 (West 2018). 
 15. In recent years, some jurisdictions have attempted to strengthen punishments 
for mandated reporters who fail to make reports.  See, e.g., S.B. 135, 2017 Gen. 
Assemb., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) (proposing criminal penalties for mandated 
reporters who “knowingly fail” to make a report of abuse or neglect). 
 16. See Cecka, Abolish Anonymous Reporting, supra note 13, at 56; 42 U.S.C. § 
5106a(b)(2)(B)(i),(iv) (requiring states to have “provisions or procedures for an 
individual to report known and suspected instances of child abuse and neglect” and 
“procedures for the immediate screening, risk and safey assessment, and prompt 
investigation of such reports”). 
 17. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 612 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.201(4) 
(West 2018); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422 (McKinney 2016); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONST. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 6332–33. 
 18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(iv)–(v) (requiring states to screen and 
triage reports of child abuse or neglect); PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6334 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313 
If the worker “screens in” the call, he or she refers the family to a 
local agency office for an investigation.19  Generally, the agency has a 
specific amount of time in which to complete its investigation and 
make a determination as to whether the allegations of abuse or 
neglect are supported or warrant further intervention.20  This is the 
third decision point.  Different jurisdictions use different terms for the 
determinations that can result at this stage, some marking cases 
“indicated” or “unfounded,” others marking them “substantiated” or 
“unsubstantiated.”21  Regardless of the terms used, the legal standard 
of proof to justify government intervention generally is low.22  In 
many states, if the investigation uncovers “some credible evidence” 
that the child is at risk of harm, the case worker may “substantiate” 
the report.23  If the investigating team determines that the report is 
“unfounded,” the case is closed, and — at least in theory — the 
allegations are put to rest.24 
If a report is “substantiated,” the agency has some discretion in 
how it chooses to move forward.25  Federal law requires that state 
agencies provide “reasonable efforts” to “prevent or eliminate the 
need for removing the child from the child’s home.”26  States put this 
 
(West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.301 (West 2017); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 422, 24 
(McKinney 2016 & 2017). 
 19. See WALTER R. MCDONALD, ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF CREATING AND 
MAINTAINING A NATIONAL REGISTRY OF CHILD MALTREATMENT PERPETRATORS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. 13 (2012), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/177131/ResearchReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9TY7-6QCX]. 
 20. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 8 (2011), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm11.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LN5-FSYD] 
[hereinafter CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT]; see, e.g., N.Y. SOC. 
SERV. LAW § 424(5-b) (McKinney 2017). 
 21. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 20, at 15. 
 22. See MCDONALD, supra note 19, at 13. 
 23. As of 2009, twenty states used a standard defined as “some credible 
evidence,” “probable cause,” or similar.  Twenty-nine states required a 
“preponderance of the evidence,” while only three required a more stringent “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard. Id. 
 24. In reality, evidence of the report may remain on file with the state for many 
years. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES FOR CHILD ABUSE REPORTS 2 (2018), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/centreg.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV5L-XRX3].  
Although federal law requires states to have a procedure for removing or expunging 
“unsubstantiated or false” allegations from state registries that are open to the public 
or used for employment-related decisions, it permits child protective agencies to keep 
“information on unsubstantiated reports in their casework files to assist in future risk 
and safety assessment.” 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xii) (2017). 
 25. See Cecka, Abolish Anonymous Reporting, supra note 13, at 56. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15) (2018). 
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requirement into action in a variety of ways, including providing 
“preventive services” to families, where appropriate. For some 
families, the investigating worker might meet with the parents, offer 
support such as home cleaning, counseling, or other services, and 
conclude the interaction.  For others, the agency will remain involved 
in the family’s life for months or even years through an informal 
service relationship.27  In either case, the availability of preventive 
services that meet the needs of the family will be important to 
ensuring positive outcomes.  In many cities and states, however, 
preventive services that meet the needs of the community may not be 
readily available, or there may be long waitlists for enrollment.28  In 
these services-only cases, the agency will encounter one more 
decision point: whether and when to close the case and cease its 
involvement with the family. 
There are circumstances, however, where the agency may decide to 
take further action.  The most drastic avenue is to remove the child 
prior to going to court — an action referred to as an “emergency 
removal.”29  Short of removing the child on an emergency basis, the 
 
 27. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 20, at 81–83. 
 28. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILDREN OF COLOR IN THE CHILD WELFARE 
SYSTEM: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CHILD WELFARE COMMUNITY 20 (2003), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/children/findings/ 
[https://perma.cc/9P4A-7T6P] (describing the problem that poor and minority 
communities lack supportive services, and quoting a direct services worker reporting 
that “[w]e have waiting lists forever to get any kind of services, [including] substance 
abuse, domestic violence, [and] parenting classes.  When you go into different 
neighborhoods, Caucasian neighborhoods, we make a referral . . . within days, they 
have the services they need.  My clients wait months.  If we put in the referral or the 
case is in court but the client hasn’t gotten services yet, they’ll pull those kids.”); 
Melissa Russo, I-Team: A Proven Tool for At-Risk Families in NYC Child Abuse 
Cases Is in Crisis, Experts Say, NBC NEW YORK (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/ACS-Abuse-Prevention-Programs-
Strapped-Overloaded-NYC-de-Blasio-414105273.html [https://perma.cc/X7J9-752Q]; 
ABIGAIL KRAMER, NEW SCH. CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFAIRS, ACS IN OVERDRIVE: SINCE 
THE DEATH OF A HARLEM 6-YEAR-OLD, ARE FEWER FAMILIES GETTING THE HELP 
THEY NEED? 5–7 (2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/598217239f7456c3
d58f5b3d/1501697829473/ACS+In+Overdrive+%E2%80%94+Center+for+New+York
+City+Affairs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G2Y-WAKU]. 
 29. The Supreme Court has continually reaffirmed the fundamental nature of 
parents’ liberty interest in the upbringing of their children. See, e.g., Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and 
control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.”).  As a result, courts generally hold that parents are 
entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before an agency can intervene in the care and 
custody of their children. See, e.g., Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“As a general rule, therefore, before parents may be deprived of the care, 
custody or management of their children without their consent, due process — 
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agency can file a petition in the relevant court seeking an order 
placing the family under the supervision of the agency, or mandating 
that the parents comply with certain services or conditions to keep 
their child at home.30  The agency also may seek the court’s approval 
to remove the child or children from the home at that time.31 
If the agency goes to court to seek removal, the court will require 
the agency to show that removal is necessary in order to safeguard the 
life or health of the child.32  This is the next — and perhaps most 
consequential — decision point in a child welfare case: whether the 
child will remain at home.  This decision is made by the agency, but 
ultimately must be approved by a court.33 
If the child is removed, federal law mandates that agencies engage 
in reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his or her family.34  The 
agency will develop a service plan for the family, and the court will 
monitor the agency’s efforts through semi-annual “permanency 
hearings.”35  In these hearings, the agency must demonstrate that it 
has made satisfactory efforts in the preceding six months, and secure 
court approval for its goal for the family for the next six months.36  
 
ordinarily a court proceeding resulting in an order permitting removal — must be 
accorded to them.” (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))).  State laws 
provide for an emergency-based carve-out to this general rule, allowing for removal 
of children without a hearing in an emergency.  In these instances, parents generally 
have the right to a post-deprivation hearing within a proscribed time frame. See, e.g., 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1028 (McKinney 2010).  Most states provide that parents facing 
a disruption in the care of their children also have the right to other protections at 
this stage, such as a right to counsel. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262 (McKinney 
2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5(1) (West 2014); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§6337 (2012) (detailing right to counsel in any abuse proceeding, including a child 
abuse and/or neglect proceeding). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163, subd. 3(b) 
(West 2017) (stating that the appointment of counsel is discretionary).  The Supreme 
Court has yet to hold that access to counsel is constitutionally required. See Lassiter 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (holding that 
even at termination, whether counsel is required is a case-by-case determination). 
 30. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1027 (McKinney 2016). 
 31. See supra note 28.  This entire process can take months, or it can happen in a 
day.  For some families, the agency initially decides to provide services to the family 
without removing the children or turning to the courts, only to change that decision 
later. 
 32. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1028(b) (McKinney 2010). 
 33. See generally KRAMER, ACS IN OVERDRIVE, supra note 28, at 1 (describing 
how ACS has “drastically increased the number of families it brings into the system, 
filing more cases in Family Court and placing more children in foster care”). 
 34. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–272, 
1980; Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89 §101, 
1997. 
 35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 675 (2018); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089 (McKinney 2018). 
 36. See supra note 35. 
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Here the agency encounters another decision point: whether and 
when to seek to reunify the child with his or her parents. 
Up to and including this point, the court in many states will not yet 
have ruled as to whether the agency has shown that the parents did 
the alleged acts on which the case is based — whether the child 
actually was abused or neglected.  This decision is made by the court 
at a “fact finding” hearing.37  At this hearing, the agency has the 
burden to prove its allegations.38  If the court determines that the 
agency failed to make its case, the petition will be dismissed.  If the 
court finds that the agency carried its burden to show that the child 
was abused or neglected, however, the case proceeds to a 
dispositional hearing where a plan for the family is set.39  This plan 
can mean that the family remains together (or is reunited), that the 
child enters or remains in foster care, or that the parents or family 
must engage in specific services to remain together (or be reunited).40 
If the child is placed in foster care, the case will proceed to or be 
scheduled for a permanency hearing.41 
If the child does not return home, the final decision point is 
whether the agency should move to terminate the parent’s rights.  
Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), agencies may be 
required to move for termination if a child remains in foster care for 
fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months.42  There are, 
however, exceptions to this requirement that the agency may invoke 
to avoid its obligation to move for termination.43  Ultimately, the 
court will make the termination decision, but it is the agency that 
makes the initial choice whether to move forward towards 
termination or to invoke an exception to ASFA.44 
Throughout this process, it should be noted that the child 
protective agencies are tasked with playing a conflicting, dual role: 
 
 37. States may refer to this hearing by different names, including “fact finding” or 
“adjudication.”  See, e.g., Child and Family Services Review Information Portal, 
Adjudication Hearing, https://training.cfsrportal.acf.hhs.gov/section-2-understanding-
child-welfare-system/3022 [https://perma.cc/6764-NMGT]. 
 38. See, e.g., In re Negus T., 996 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (2d Dep’t 2014); N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 1046 (McKinney 2009). 
 39. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1051–52 (McKinney 2016). 
 40. See id. § 1052. 
 41. See, e.g., id. § 1055. 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
 43. These include situations where the child is being cared for by a relative, where 
the agency documents that there is a “compelling reason” why filing for termination 
“would not be in the best interests of the child,” or the State has failed to provide the 
necessary services to accomplish the goal of reunification. Id. 
 44. See id. 
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they are both support and service provider, as well as investigator, 
prosecutor, and enforcer.45 
B. Flaws in Human Decision-Making 
At each of the decision points discussed above, a community 
member, the child welfare agency, or the court is called upon to make 
a vital, highly consequential decision.  Of these actors, it is the 
agencies that have the most control, deciding which cases to 
investigate, which to bring to court, when and how to provide services 
or remove children from their homes, and how to proceed through 
the court process.  It also is the agencies that are implementing 
predictive analytics.  For this reason, this section focuses on the 
agency and asks: what do we know about the quality of the agency’s 
decision-making? 
There is ample evidence that the way child welfare agencies make 
decisions is deeply flawed.46  Social science shows that workers tasked 
with making important child protective decisions often fall victim to 
the effects of heuristics and bias.47  As a systemic issue, there are also 
trends that indicate that child welfare decision-making can and should 
be improved.  Among those, we can count the racial 
disproportionality evident in child welfare systems nationwide, as well 
as the repeated occurrence of “foster care panics” — when agencies 
ramp up investigations and removals in the wake of tragedies. 
 
 45. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD 
WELFARE 148 (Reprint ed. 2002); see also Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory 
State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 353–54 
(2014). 
 46. Anecdotally, anyone who has worked in a family court can rattle off a handful 
of stories on command that detail problems ranging from a lack of attention or 
information on the part of a caseworker, to the disconnected override of a fact-based, 
on-the-ground decision by a removed, faceless superior, to at times seemingly 
targeted, malicious harassment.  For example, it was not an infrequent occurrence for 
lawyers in my office to meet parents on the first day of their family court case who 
had just come from a meeting with the agency, called a “child safety conference.”  
Sometimes, the decision in the room at that conference — arrived at after a lengthy 
discussion among the case worker, facilitator, parent, and sometimes the child or 
other person intimately involved with the family — was that the child would be safe 
remaining at home with certain supports in place.  But when the caseworker stepped 
out of the room to run this conclusion by his or her supervisor, who often had never 
met the family, that decision was changed unilaterally. 
 47. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Social Science of Agency Decision-Making 
Human decision-makers are known to be fallible.  Researchers 
across many academic disciplines have studied human decisions and 
identified a number of “common errors” to which we fall victim.48  
Perhaps one of the most documented logical errors to which human 
decision-makers succumb is confirmation bias — the tendency to 
readily assimilate or recall evidence that supports a previously-held 
belief, and to discount evidence that contradicts that belief.49  People 
also are swayed by “framing effects.”50  This means that people make 
different decisions based on how choices are presented to them: their 
decision changes based on the reference point against which it is 
evaluated.51  And human decision-makers are affected by the 
availability heuristic: the tendency to overestimate the importance or 
likelihood of an event that is “cognitively available” or, as Cass 
Sunstein put it, “vivid and salient.”52 
Expertise is not corrective and can even have an adverse effect.  
Indeed, experts have been found to be “particularly bad at 
prediction.”53  As noted psychologist Daniel Kahneman has shown, 
experts across fields, “from stock brokers to job recruiters,” make 
poor decisions and are inconsistent in their choices.54  Only where 
experts receive “frequent and immediate” feedback on the outcomes 
of their decisions do they tend to improve.55 
When it comes to making risk predictions, particular errors 
emerge.  Among these are findings that human decision-makers have 
difficulty accurately assessing the likelihood that a particular event 
will occur.56  Decision-makers tend to rely insufficiently on the base 
 
 48. See, e.g., Amy D’Andrade et al., Risk and Safety Assessment in Child 
Welfare, 5 1/2 J. EVIDENCE-BASED SOC. WORK 31, 3–4 (2008). 
 49. See, e.g., Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). 
 50. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCI. 
AM. 160, 166 (1982). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Cass Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and 
Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 75 (2005) (noting that the 
availability heuristic “can make some risks stand out as particularly salient, regardless 
of their actual magnitude”). 
 53. Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks out of Child Protection Risk Analysis, 21 
J.L. & POL’Y 5, 19 (2012). 
 54. Id. (citing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 209–44 (2011)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See generally ANGELA WHITE & PETER WALSH, CTR. FOR PARENTING & 
RESEARCH, RISK ASSESSMENT IN CHILD WELFARE (2006), 
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rate of an event’s occurrence when attempting predictions about 
“uncommon” events.57  They often overestimate their own ability to 
predict a future event and have a hard time assigning appropriate 
weight to factors related to a given decision.58  And “illusory 
correlations,” or the “tendency to see two events as related when they 
are not,” can affect the accuracy of human predictions.59 
Researchers have studied child welfare workers directly, and the 
evidence suggests that each of these errors is present in their 
decisions.  A 1999 study, for example, found great variability among 
case workers in assessing the need for removal of the same child.60  
Case workers were found to suffer from a version of the availability 
heuristic, basing their decisions on a “limited range of data” by 
focusing more on more memorable experiences and failing to access 
information about less salient occurrences.61  Another study reviewed 
forty-five child abuse inquiry reports published in Britain between 
1973 and 1994, and found that social workers in these cases made 
“three general types of errors.”62  These errors included being “slow 
to revise their judgments,” interpreting and weighing new evidence in 
light of their initial assessment of the family.63  The case workers also 
exhibited confirmation bias, approaching information that conflicted 
with their initial assessment of a family with skepticism, but failing to 
apply a critical eye to new information that comported with their 
preexisting view.64  Finally, the case workers gave more weight to 
information coming from certain sources over others. For example, 
doctors carried greater influence than neighbors, regardless of 
whether those sources truly had more or better information.65  At 
each of the decision points described above, the case workers are 
tasked with making decisions that can have life-changing 
consequences for families.  But scientific research shows that case 
workers, being human, fall victim to bias in their thinking and are not 
 
http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/321647/research_riskas
sessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6U4-C9UY]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Garrison, supra note 53, at 32–34. 
 59. WHITE & WALSH, supra note 56, at 4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (discussing Eileen Munro, Common Errors of Reasoning in Child 
Protection Work, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 745 (1999)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 4–5. 
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particularly good at weighing evidence to accurately predict events 
(especially infrequent events such as child fatalities). 
Notably, the one identified corrective for the failures of expert 
decision-making — frequent and immediate feedback — generally is 
unavailable to child protective decision-makers.  The outcomes of 
their decisions likely will not be known for years, perhaps decades, as 
the child matures.  The intervening effects of myriad other decisions, 
made by numerous actors like supervisors, other workers, and the 
court, make determining the actual impact of any one decision nearly 
impossible.  And it generally is not possible to assess any particular 
decision in reference to the counter-factual.  Where an agency 
determines that removal is necessary, for example, it is not possible to 
measure the outcome that would have occurred if that child had 
remained with his or her parent. 
2. Disproportionality 
The prior section has shown that human decision-making, and in 
particular human risk-prediction, is vulnerable to error.  The fact that 
decision-makers fall victim to the heuristics described above also 
means that their decisions become entry-points for bias — both 
explicit and implicit.66  The disproportionate number of poor children 
and children of color represented at every stage in the child welfare 
process is strong evidence of the insidious effect of bias.67  It is well-
documented that Black children are overrepresented nationally in the 
child welfare system.68  Hispanic children also are overrepresented in 
a substantial number of state systems, and this overrepresentation is 
 
 66. As used here, explicit bias refers to the intentional act of favoring one group 
over another.  Implicit bias is “the automatically activated evaluations or stereotypes 
that affect [an] individual’s understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious 
manner . . . .  All humans exhibit implicit bias, and having these biases does not 
reflect the intent to cause harm.”  KELLY CAPATOSTO, KIRWAN INST., FORETELLING 
THE FUTURE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE USE OF PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN 
CHILD WELFARE 2 (2017), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/ki-predictive-analytics.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9J3-DVN6]. 
 67. Although disproportionality is well documented, there exists a debate in the 
child welfare literature around its cause.  For a detailed discussion of this debate, see 
Tanya A. Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National Debate, 97 
MARQ. L. REV. 215, 229–39 (2013).  This Article does not intend to resolve this 
debate, but only to point out that this disproportionality exists, calling into question 
the legitimacy of child welfare decisions.  As discussed further infra, without careful 
attention to both the underlying problem and the design of new risk assessment tools, 
predictive analytics will only serve to compound these problems because they are 
based on historical data that is, itself, infected by bias. See infra Part III. 
 68. See Cooper, supra note 67, at 224–25. 
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only rising.69  The same is true for Native American children in every 
jurisdiction in which they reside.70  This overrepresentation is present 
throughout all phases of the child welfare process: Black and Native 
American children are twice as likely to undergo investigation, it is 
twice as likely that such investigations will be found credible, and it is 
two or three times more likely that Black or Native American 
children will be placed in foster care.71  Note that this means that 
these levels of disproportionality only worsen as families move 
through the system.72  Poor children also are vastly overrepresented 
in the system.73  As Professor Dorothy Roberts put it, “the public 
child welfare system in America is populated almost exclusively by 
poor children.”74  Because families of color are disproportionately 
poor,75 these two trends are inextricably intertwined and cannot be 
understood in isolation.76 
 
 69. ROBERT B. HILL, CASEY-CSSP ALL. FOR RACIAL EQUITY IN CHILD WELFARE, 
AN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY AT THE 
NATIONAL, STATE, AND COUNTY LEVELS (2007), 
https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-AnalysisofRacialEthnicDisproportionality-
2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV4B-PM33]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 10. 
 72. Id. at 9. See also Harris & Hackett, supra note 11, at 211 (conducting study of 
racial disproportionality across decision points in King County, Washington child 
welfare system, and finding that “[a]t each successive decision point, the gap in 
outcomes widens according to race”).  In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, the 
jurisdiction at the forefront of developing its own predictive analytic tool for child 
welfare, disproportionality is evident throughout a family’s involvement in the 
system. See ALLEGHENY CTY. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DATA BRIEF: RACIAL 
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 2 (Sept. 
2017).  Notably, the largest share of Allegheny County’s disproportionality problems 
arises at the referral stage: in 2015, Black children were 3.5 times more likely, and bi- 
or multi-racial children were 2.8 times more likely, than white children to be referred 
to the county’s child protective service for an investigation.  Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Harris & Hackett, supra note 11, at 201. 
 74. Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare 
Policy Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 63, 64 (1999). 
 75. See Cooper, supra note 67, at 229. 
 76. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1676 
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Race also matters because of persistent racial 
inequality in society — inequality that cannot be ignored and that has produced stark 
socioeconomic disparities.”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298–99 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory 
past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully 
evident in our communities and schools.  In the wake of a system of racial caste only 
recently ended, large disparities endure” in areas such as unemployment, poverty, 
and access to health care (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also 
Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 
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3. Foster Care “Panics” 
Further evidence of the failures of human decision-making comes 
in the form of “foster care panics” — the tendency of child welfare 
systems to engage in a frenzied push toward removal of children from 
their homes following the highly publicized death of a child.77  New 
York City has recently seen a version of this phenomenon following 
the deaths of six-year-old Zymere Perkins and three-year-old Jaden 
Jordan, which happened just months apart.78  New York had done 
admirable work to reduce its foster care population over the years 
preceding these deaths, but after they occurred, abuse and neglect 
reports, investigations, and case filings skyrocketed.79  In the months 
and years following these tragedies, New York’s child protective 
authority, the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS), 
investigated drastically more cases than before.80  Once families were 
under investigation, ACS was far more likely to pursue action in 
court, and the number of emergency removals increased by thirty 
percent.81  Advocates for families on the ground during this panic 
reported that ACS seemed to be making unjustified removals more 
frequently.82  This anecdotal reporting is borne out by the evidence. 
 
1389, 1394 (2012) (“Because poor Americans are disproportionately minority and 
female, it is impossible to talk about class without taking into account how 
subordination is linked to race and gender.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Petula Dvorak, Child Deaths Led to Excessive Foster Care 
Placements, Critics Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2009), 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.law.udc.edu/resource/resmgr/fraidin/fraidin_washpost_0
10809.pdf [https://perma.cc/C38Q-L2QX]. 
 78. Yoav Gonen, Child Abuse Reports Surge After High-Profile Tragedies, N.Y. 
POST (July 24, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/07/24/child-abuse-reports-surge-after-
high-profile-tragedies/ [https://perma.cc/23LS-JURF]. 
 79. KRAMER, ACS IN OVERDRIVE, supra note 28, at 2.  According to a later report 
by this same author, referrals to New York’s child maltreatment hotline increased by 
nearly eleven percent in the twenty months following Perkins’s death when compared 
with the twenty-month period that preceded it.  ABIGAIL KRAMER, NEW SCH. CTR. 
FOR N.Y.C., CHILD WELFARE SURGE CONTINUES: FAMILY COURT CASES, 
EMERGENCY CHILD REMOVALS REMAIN UP 2, 4 (2018), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/5b50c5c38a922d32
11b6606d/1532020164221/Child+Welfare+Surge+Continues.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AU56-PFSB]. 
 80. KRAMER, CHILD WELFARE SURGE CONTINUES, supra note 79, at 1. 
 81. Id. (“Between October 2016 and May 2018, ACS reported approximately 
2,300 emergency removals — a 28 percent jump from a corresponding 20-month span 
before the crisis.”).  These statistics do not capture the true numbers of children 
separated from their families during this “panic.”  According to Kramer, “ACS does 
not publicly report emergency removal cases in which a child is reunited with his or 
her family at the initial court hearing.” Id. 
 82. Id. at 3. 
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Although ACS’s use of its emergency removal power jumped 
considerably, the foster care population ultimately did not see an 
equally drastic increase.83  The number of children placed in foster 
care in the ten months following Perkins’s death rose by about four 
percent,84 indicating that the court system may have acted as a 
somewhat effective check on the agency’s panic.  The trauma of these 
emergency removals, however, had already been inflicted.85 
This type of foster care panic is not new, not even to New York 
City itself. New York experienced a similar panic in 1996 following 
the death of Elisa Izquierdo, and again in 2006 following the death of 
Nixmary Brown.86  Illinois experienced its own version of the 
phenomenon in the 1990s, following the 1993 death of three-year-old 
Joseph Wallace.87  Countless other cities and states have cycled 
through their own foster care panics.88 
Although these societal reactions to high-profile child deaths may 
be understandable, they are not logical.  There is no evidence that 
levels of child abuse or neglect in the population increase during these 
periods,89 but there is ample evidence that foster care panics actually 
make children less safe.  In Illinois, for example, child welfare 
authorities abruptly abandoned the state’s developing family 
preservation program, Families First, in the wake of Wallace’s death 
in 1993.90  Following this move, deaths of children attributed to abuse 
 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Sankaran & Church, supra note 2, at 211–12. 
 86. Once Again, New York City Children Pay the Price of Foster Care Panic, 
NCCPR CHILD WELFARE BLOG (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.nccprblog.org/2016/12/once-again-new-york-city-children-pay.html 
[https://perma.cc/CS54-F73T] [hereinafter Once Again, New York City Children Pay 
the Price]. 
 87. ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 147–48. 
 88. See, e.g., NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE PANICS: 
ISSUE PAPER 2, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B291mw_hLAJsMGdWQ2NhYTM2Ulk/view 
[https://perma.cc/ES6G-J7WJ] (documenting Illinois’s and New York’s experience as 
well as a panic set off in 1999 in Florida following the death of a child “known to the 
system”) [hereinafter NCCPR, Foster Care Panics]; Dvorak, supra note 77 
(describing Washington, D.C. panic). 
 89. In fact, children in New York may have been safer in the months surrounding 
Zymere Perkins’s death than at any time in recent years. Once Again, New York City 
Children Pay the Price, supra note 86. (“The percentage of children reabused in 2016 
was the lowest since 2009.  The rate of foster-care recidivism was the lowest since 
2006.”). 
 90. ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 147; see also NCCPR, Foster Care Panics, supra 
note 88, at 1. 
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rose from seventy-eight prior to the cancellation of Families First to 
ninety-one in 1997.91  Sharp increases in investigations increase 
worker case-loads, resulting in higher worker attrition and diverting 
attention from those children and families that may actually need 
support.92  This means that less experienced workers are making 
decisions about children’s safety with less time and under increased 
pressure.93  More children are needlessly exposed to the trauma of 
removal.  Case workers operating during panics admit that decisions 
made during these times are not based on sound assessments of 
children’s safety, but instead on dangerous, self-protective 
mentalities.  As one caseworker put it: 
At this point everybody’s so afraid, they’d rather cover their ass . . . .  
Take the case to court and let the judge say no.  Then we can 
document we tried.  Nobody wants to end up with their face in the 
Daily News.  They don’t want to face criminal charges.94 
It is clear that responsible agency decision-making breaks down 
during foster care panics. 
C. Decision-Making Models Employed by Child Welfare Systems 
In part because of concerns regarding inconsistent, biased, and 
otherwise flawed decision-making, child protective agencies have 
shifted from relying on clinical decision-making models to ever more 
formalized and structured models.  Predictive analytics represent the 
latest and perhaps most powerful step in this shift, but the advent of 
these tools is an extension of a process that has been ongoing for 
many years.95  Inspired by public health methodologies, child welfare 
agencies across the country have already incorporated a micro-level 
version of an algorithm into their decision-making processes, in the 
form of “structured decision-making” models, or “SDM.”96 
In contrast to older, clinical models that require experienced, 
trained clinicians to make individualized judgments in each case, 
 
 91. ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 148. 
 92. KRAMER, ACS IN OVERDRIVE, supra note 28, at 4–5; KRAMER, CHILD 
WELFARE SURGE CONTINUES, supra note 79, at 3. 
 93. KRAMER, ACS IN OVERDRIVE, supra note 28, at 4–5; KRAMER, CHILD 
WELFARE SURGE CONTINUES, supra note 79, at 3. 
 94. KRAMER, CHILD WELFARE SURGE CONTINUES, supra note 79, at 3. 
 95. See Garrison, supra note 53, at 17. 
 96. Id. at 25 (“[A]ctuarial risk assessment has, over time, come to dominate the 
field.”); D’Andrade et al., supra note 48, at 32 (“Most states in the US formalize the 
process of assessing risk by using some type of structured decision-making process or 
tool.”). 
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SDM models are themselves a version of an algorithm.97  They 
provide case workers with a structured guide for arriving at decisions.  
SDM tools often take the form of a questionnaire, which the case 
worker or team will fill in with answers according to their on-the-
ground knowledge of the family.98 
These tools come in two forms: consensus-based and actuarial.  
Consensus-based questionnaires can be lengthy, and include 
questions about a broad range of topics.99  Many of the questions 
require highly subjective judgments on the part of the case worker, 
and grant the worker a fair amount of flexibility.100  Actuarial 
questionnaires “employ the methods of epidemiology” by using 
samples of actual substantiated cases, through which researchers 
“determine which case characteristics are significant predictors of 
filing and substantiation recurrence.”101  In other words, these 
actuarial risk assessments are precursors to the predictive analytic 
tools being developed today.  They require case workers and teams to 
fill out a “score sheet” by answering questions geared to elicit specific 
information.102  For example, the score sheet may ask for the type of 
allegation (e.g., abuse or neglect), demographic information about the 
family (e.g., the number of children or adults in the home and their 
ages), or the number of prior cases the family has had.103  But such 
actuarial tools also may demand subjective judgments, such as the 
worker’s perception of the primary caretaker’s level of motivation to 
improve parenting skills, whether the parent “viewed the situation 
less seriously than the investigator,” or “failed to cooperate 
satisfactorily.”104 
Actuarial structured decision-making tools have their advantages 
and have been found to lead to more consistent decision-making in 
child welfare cases relative to consensus-based decision-making 
models.105  However, actuarial tools also present risks.  There is a 
 
 97. See Garrison, supra note 53, at 22–23. 
 98. Id. at 22. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id.  One example of a consensus-based tool is the Washington Risk 
Assessment Matrix (WRAM), which “requires inquiry into thirty-seven different 
issues, some of which (e.g., caregiver-child relationship) are difficult to measure 
objectively.” Id. 
 101. Id. at 23. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 24 fig.2, 28–29. 
 105. Id. at 23.  Studies conducted by the developer of one of the most widely-used 
SDM tools also found that SDM did a “significantly better job in predicting 
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fundamental flaw in attempting to graft public health methods of 
epidemiological prediction onto child protective work.106  Public 
health as a field concentrates on populations, not on individuals, and 
seeks to offer prevention programs, not treatment.  Imposing public 
health tools on child protective models thus poses significant risks, as 
child welfare generally aims to make more difficult, individual-level 
predictions about each child.107  To date, child protection has oriented 
itself as a “blame and cure system,” which focuses resources on 
investigating and, when needed, prosecuting individual reports, rather 
than seeking to implement broader, population-level prevention 
programs.108 
The actuarial questionnaires themselves also present serious 
problems.  First, actuarial models have been developed without a 
standard definition of abuse, neglect, or maltreatment.109  Without 
such standardized definitions, it is impossible to be sure what is being 
measured.110  Second, these tools often incorporate substantial 
subjectivity, and thereby “reintroduce all the problems with intuitive 
judgments that decision-making algorithms were designed to 
avoid.”111  Third, actuarial SDM models tend to focus exclusively on 
“negative risk factors,” and are static, meaning they do not 
incorporate changes in the family’s situation easily.112  Lastly, 
researchers have expressed concern that actuarial tools are not used 
 
subsequent investigation and substantiation of maltreatment” than consensus-based 
models.  Id. at 23–25.  These studies also found that SDM tools made it more likely 
that an agency would close a low-risk case and involve high-risk families (as defined 
by the tools) in services and that high-risk families tended to have fewer subsequent 
substantiated reports and lower rates of foster care placement. Id.; see also WASH. 
STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, STRUCTURED DECISION MAKING® RISK ASSESSMENT: 
DOES IT REDUCE RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN WASHINGTON’S CHILD WELFARE 
SYSTEM? 2 (2011), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1086/Wsipp_Structured-
Decision-Making-Risk-Assessment-Does-it-Reduce-Racial-Disproportionality-in-
Washingtons-Child-Welfare-System_Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC35-DN6C] 
(describing finding that the consensus-based WRM “was not a good predictor of 
future abuse or neglect”). 
 106. Garrison, supra note 53, at 7–17. 
 107. Id. at 8.  For example, we may be confident that smoking is highly correlated 
with lung cancer, and successfully target prevention efforts at all smokers.  However, 
we cannot predict that any one particular smoker will develop lung cancer.  Id. at 16–
17. 
 108. Id. at 5, 7. 
 109. Id. at 25–26. 
 110. Id. at 26. 
 111. Id. at 29. 
 112. Id. at 29–30. 
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properly.113  For instance, research into the ways these tools are used 
in practice has revealed that case workers or other users may enter 
information only after a decision has already been reached, changing 
their answers to support their conclusion.114 
II. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN CHILD WELFARE 
This Article has thus far demonstrated that child welfare decision-
making must be improved.  As the system stands today, even experts 
tasked with making vital child welfare decisions fall victim to the 
influence of heuristics and bias.  Children of color and children from 
poor households are vastly over-represented in the system, and the 
system itself is vulnerable to panics that unjustifiably pull children 
away from their homes in record numbers.  Tools developed to 
combat some of these problems have thus far failed to do so 
successfully, and present their own slew of risks, including undefined 
standards, subjectivity, focus on static, negative risk factors, and 
misuse. 
A tempting prospect has emerged in response to this reality — 
using the growing field of “predictive analytics” to improve child 
welfare decision-making.  But can machines actually help us in this 
complex and fundamentally human endeavor?  To begin to answer 
this question, we must first understand what predictive analytics are 
and how they function.  This Part provides an overview of the 
processes that produce predictive algorithms.  It shows that these 
efforts are not “purely scientific,” but instead are the result of myriad, 
fundamentally human choices that “packag[e] policy as data 
science.”115  It then goes on to describe some of the predictive 
analytics tools currently in use in child protective efforts. 
 
 113. Philip Gillingham, Predictive Risk Modelling to Prevent Child Maltreatment 
and Other Adverse Outcomes for Service Users: Inside the ‘Black Box’ of Machine 
Learning, 46 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 1044, 1045 (2016) (“[A] criticism has been that even 
the best risk-assessment tools are ‘operator-driven’ as they need to be applied by 
humans.  Research about how practitioners actually use risk-assessment tools has 
demonstrated that there is little certainty that they use them as intended by their 
designers.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Julie Ciccolini & Cynthi Conti-Cook, Rationing Justice: Risk Assessment 
Instruments in the American Criminal Justice System, EUROPENOW (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/11/07/rationing-justice-risk-assessment-
instruments-in-the-american-criminal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/NYR2-PET5]. 
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A. Predictive Analytics: An Overview 
Predictive analytics is an overarching term that broadly describes 
the creation of algorithms designed to predict specific outcomes based 
on historical data.  In its most basic form, an “algorithm” is simply a 
set of instructions for solving a problem.116  The creation of an 
algorithm may be the result of traditional statistical modeling or 
machine learning processes, which are automated processes geared 
toward “discovering correlations . . . between variables in a 
dataset.”117 
By using these statistical or machine learning approaches, 
developers mine vast amounts of “administrative data” — data 
gathered for operational purposes and held by various government 
entities — to attempt to discover correlations: tendencies for certain 
factors to occur together.118  The data mined by these systems in the 
child welfare context often includes data arising directly out of the 
child welfare agency’s involvement with the family, such as past 
substantiated reports.119  Depending on the jurisdiction, however, the 
 
 116. Jennifer Golbeck, How to Teach Yourself About Algorithms, SLATE (Feb. 9, 
2016), https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/how-to-teach-yourself-about-
algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/R7TP-GYXF]. See also Solon Barocas & Andrew 
D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 n.10 (2016) (“An 
‘algorithm’ is a formally specified sequence of logical operations that provides step-
by-step instructions for computers to act on data and thus automate decisions.”); 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981) (“We defined ‘algorithm’ as a ‘procedure 
for solving a given type of mathematical problem.’” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972))).  In the context of machine learning, an algorithm specifically 
is “a set of mathematical steps for achieving . . . learning . . . when exposed to 
historical or example data.”  David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What 
Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 
671 (2017). 
 117. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 116, at 671.  In his book Predictive Analytics, Eric 
Siegel describes “machine learning” as the “academic term” for predictive analytics, 
stating that, in “commercial, industrial, and government applications,” this process is 
“called something else”: predictive analytics. ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: 
THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 33 (2016).  Siegel goes 
on to define predictive analytics as “[t]echnology that learns from experience (data) 
to predict the future behavior of individuals in order to drive better decisions.” Id.  
While the conclusion of this definition, that predictive analytics drive “better 
decisions,” involves a complicated value judgment implicated by the discussion in 
Part III, infra, the description of predictive analytics as “technology that learns from 
experience” in the form of data in order to “predict future behavior” serves us well. 
 118. See David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 
42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2016) (“Decisions that matter will now be based on 
correlations, not hard facts.”). 
 119. See RHEMA VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., DEVELOPING PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS 
TO SUPPORT CHILD MALTREATMENT HOTLINE SCREENING DECISIONS: ALLEGHEY 
COUNTY METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION (Apr. 2017), 
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data may have been gathered by the government from any number of 
public touchpoints, such as criminal justice, public benefits, public 
hospitals, birth records, education records, and more.120 
Where machine learning approaches are used, predictive 
algorithms are developed by a multi-stage process.121  Each step 
requires developers to make a series of choices that implicate their 
knowledge of the system in which they operate, their own biases or 
value judgments, and the biases and value judgments of the 
community directing their work. 
The effort of designing any predictive risk model begins with the 
problem definition, in that a predictive model “must predict or 
estimate something, and the first step of any analysis is to define what 
that something should be.”122  The prediction the tool makes can be 
called an “outcome of interest” or a “target variable.”123  Selecting a 
“target variable” is an inherently subjective and open-ended design 
process, requiring data scientists to translate the amorphous 
“outcome of interest” identified into a question “that computers can 
parse.”124 
The question of what outcome a model is predicting is fundamental 
to the validity of any predictive tool.125  In the “learning” process, the 
“outcome variable acts as a teacher.”126  For computers to predict a 
particular outcome successfully, that outcome must be well-defined 
and must relate well to on-the-ground reality, or “ground truth.”127  
 
https://www.alleghenycountyanalytics.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Developing-
Predictive-Risk-Models-package-with-cover-1-to-post-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJV4-
VRBS]. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id.  These stages are not necessarily linear; the process of developing any 
given model can and should dance back and forth across and between these stages, 
from focusing on design back to data, and back and forth again. Lehr & Ohm, supra 
note 116, at 672–73.  Decisions made at each stage affect and are affected by 
decisions made at earlier and later stages. Id. at 671. 
 122. Id. at 672–73. 
 123. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 116, at 678. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Gillingham, supra note 113, at 1052 (describing the “particular challenge in 
applying predictive machine learning techniques” to child welfare, of “finding valid 
and reliable outcome variables within data about service activity”). 
 126. Id. at 1052. 
 127. CHRISTOPHER KINGSLEY & STEFANIA DI MAURO-NAVA, METROLAB 
NETWORK, FIRST DO NO HARM: ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING PREDICTIVE 
TOOLS WITHIN HUMAN SERVICES (2017), https://metrolabnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Ethical-Guidelines-for-Applying-Predictive-Tools-within-
Human-Services_Sept-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY3W-GDDB]. 
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Otherwise, the predictive tool will learn unhelpful rules and make less 
accurate predictions.128 
Once the problem is defined, the data that will make up the fibers 
of the model must be collected.  As part of this stage, developers 
determine what sources of data are available to them and how they 
will be used.129  Once data is collected, developers must go through a 
series of processes to prepare it for use in the model.  Developers may 
be called upon to make normative decisions while preparing the data 
that affect the later functioning of the model.130  For instance, they 
may need to decide where to populate missing data with average 
terms, or where to exclude data when some elements are missing. 
Once the data is in good shape, the development team can move to 
designing the algorithm itself.  Although algorithms often are 
discussed as “black boxes”131 that spit out predictions based on 
hidden, impenetrable processes, they actually are the product of 
intentional design choices by their creators.  Data scientists have 
developed various categories or types of algorithmic models from 
which developers can choose.  None is inherently better than all 
others; each has particular strengths and drawbacks.132  For example, 
one type of algorithm may be designed more simply and therefore be 
easier to explain to a lay audience, but its predictions may be less 
accurate.  Others may generate more accurate predictions, but the 
processes by which they arrive at those predictions may be vastly 
more difficult (or impossible) to explain.133 
Once selected, a machine learning algorithmic model must be 
“trained.”  During this process, the “algorithm is run on the training 
data set and, in the process, learns rules for predicting the 
outcome.”134  As the algorithm runs, sometimes many times over, 
 
 128. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 116, at 676. 
 129. See id. at 679. 
 130. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 80 
(2017). 
 131. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 3 (2015) (describing an 
algorithm as “a system whose workings are mysterious; we can observe its inputs and 
outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other”). 
 132. See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 1277, 1288 (2018). 
 133. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 116, at 688–90. 
 134. Id. at 695–96.  In the case of the predictive risk model employed by the 
Allegheny County research team, the “algorithm ‘learns’ by calculating the 
correlation between each predictor, or independent, variable (a piece of information 
about the child, parent or parent’s partner) and the outcome, or dependent, variable 
(a substantiation or not of maltreatment by age five) across all the individual cases in 
the training data set.” Gillingham, supra note 113, at 1048. 
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data scientists assess and adjust it in various ways.  Each adjustment 
requires the developers to make subjective and value-laden 
judgments.  One way in which developers adjust models during 
training is to engage in “feature selection.”  Of the data points 
available to input into the model, the developers must “prune” away 
those that are not required in the final model, leaving only those that 
are necessary for the model to run effectively.135 
Finally, an algorithm that has been designed, trained, and tested 
becomes a “running model,” graduating from its training and test 
data, to begin making predictions based on live data in the real 
world.136  After an algorithm has been deployed, this process of 
adjustment and re-adjustment can and should continue, as flaws, 
biases, and other issues with the algorithm become apparent.  
Additionally, real-world conditions may change, affecting the 
accuracy of even the best-trained model.137 
B. The Current State of Affairs 
Numerous jurisdictions around the country already are 
experimenting with and using predictive analytic models in their child 
protective efforts, in a variety of ways and likely to varied effect.  As 
of 2018, there was publicly-available evidence that child protective 
authorities in more than a dozen states were using or developing 
predictive analytic tools.138 Many other jurisdictions are interested in 
 
 135. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 116, at 700–01. 
 136. Id. at 670. 
 137. Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 576 (2015) (“[T]o retain their accuracy, risk instruments 
must be constantly re-normed for changing populations and subpopulations.”). 
 138. New York City, for example, is developing its own tools in-house.  According 
to agency officials, New York’s Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) is using 
its model primarily as a “quality assurance” vehicle. Child Welfare Organizing 
Project & New School Center for New York City Affairs, Automating Inequality in 
Child Welfare Using Predictive Analytics Panel, FACEBOOK (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.facebook.com/166753923391170/videos/1798471443552735/ 
[https://perma.cc/X95L-MARD] [hereinafter Automating Inequality Panel].  As 
described by ACS Deputy Commissioner Andrew White in 2018, ACS’s “analytic 
team” created a predictive tool that “does a pretty excellent job predicting the 
likelihood that a child will experience severe physical harm or sexual abuse at some 
point in the two years following the start of an investigation.” Id.  New York’s ACS 
has yet to publish details or studies of this tool and its performance.  Similarly, 
Wisconsin undertook an effort to develop a model to help the agency allocate post-
reunification services. Id.  The Wisconsin model sought to assess the likelihood of a 
child’s reentry into foster care after reunification, which the agency would then use to 
decide whether families would receive services upon reunification.  Families with 
higher scores were eligible for services, and those with lower scores were not. Id. 
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or considering implementation of these tools.139  The two most well-
documented predictive tools currently in use by child welfare agencies 
are those developed by and used in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 
called the Allegheny Family Screening Tool, or AFST,140 and a tool 
developed by a Florida non-profit, the Eckerd Rapid Safety Feedback 
tool. 
1. The Allegheny Family Screening Tool 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, is at the forefront of using 
predictive analytics in its child protective efforts.  In 2014, Allegheny 
County’s Department of Human Services (DHS) put out a request for 
proposals, seeking partners with whom to develop a tool based on the 
data available to the county.141  The county ultimately selected a team 
of researchers from Auckland, New Zealand, and California, who 
developed the Allegheny Family Screening Tool (AFST).142  The 
AFST went into use in August 2016.143 
Allegheny County’s DHS uses the AFST at the screening stage, 
when call center workers must determine whether to “screen in” a 
call.144  The research team stated that its objective was “to develop a 
decision aid to support hotline screeners in determining whether a 
maltreatment referral is of sufficient concern to warrant an in-person 
investigation,” and not to “replace human decision-making.”145 
The AFST pulls together data from a number of county systems 
that document families’ relationships with public services in nearly 
every area of life.146  In addition to data documenting a family’s prior 
involvement with child protective authorities, the AFST pulls data 
from the County’s jail, juvenile probation, public welfare, behavioral 
 
 139. Interview with Marina Martin, Tech. & Democracy Fellow, New Am. Found. 
(Aug. 2, 2018). 
 140. See VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 1. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 4. 
 145. Id.  The research team has been relatively open with its process, publishing a 
report detailing much of its work. Id.; see also Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, 
Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 146 (2018). 
 146. Allegheny County started this process in a slightly different place than many 
jurisdictions around the country.  Before designing and implementing its predictive 
risk-modeling tool, Allegheny County had already created an “integrated client 
service record and data management system” that brought together data from 
various government service touchpoints. VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 
5. 
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health, and census systems. 147  This data includes, among other 
things, dates of past bookings into the Allegheny County Jail or past 
involvement with the Allegheny County Juvenile Probation Office, 
whether and when a family received public benefits such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known 
as food stamps), whether and when an individual received behavioral 
health services, including diagnoses, as well as information such as a 
family’s zip code, linked with Census information on the poverty 
status of each zip code area.148 
The AFST algorithm analyzes 112 variables drawn from these data 
sets, and pulls together these data points to return a “risk score” for 
each specific child with one of two outcomes in mind: re-referral and 
placement.149  The re-referral model predicts the likelihood that a 
child who is “screened out” during the initial call will be re-referred 
to the agency by someone in the community within two years of that 
screen-out.150  The placement model is designed to predict the 
likelihood that a child who is “screened in” will be removed from his 
or her home within two years.151  For each model, the risk score is 
reported on a scale from 1 to 20.152  Each number along the scoring 
continuum represents the strata of risk in which the child’s score sits, 
with 20 representing that “the child is in the top 5% of risk scores” 
from the model.153 
As a practical matter, the AFST is incorporated into the county’s 
process at the screening stage. When a referral is made, call center 
workers must evaluate the report and provide their own 
recommendations; once these recommendations are logged into the 
system, they press a “big blue button” on their computer screen, and 
 
 147. Id. at 12 (“Allegheny County has additional data sets such as birth records, 
homeless services and educational outcomes from local school districts that were not 
tested in the first iteration of the model for various reasons.  Birth records, for 
example, were not regularly being integrated into Allegheny County’s data 
warehouse at the time the model was developed.  Education data were not included 
since Allegheny County does not have full coverage of the county; it only partners 
with a subset of local school districts.  The research team will consider adding 
additional data sets to future iterations of the model but does not expect that they 
will lead to significant increases in the accuracy of the model.”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 9–10. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 27. 
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the child’s AFST risk score pops up.154  If a risk score is above a 
certain level, the family is automatically “screened in,” a result that 
can only be overridden by a supervisor.155 
Since the AFST’s deployment, Allegheny County officials have 
announced their intention to move forward with plans for an 
algorithm that will assess every child born in the county at the time of 
their birth.156  This proposal is controversial, to say the least.157 
 
 154. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS 
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 128, 140 (2018) [hereinafter EUBANKS, 
AUTOMATING INEQUALITY]. 
 155. Virginia Eubanks reported that “[i]f a family’s AFST risk score is high 
enough, the system automatically triggers an investigation.” Virginia Eubanks, A 
Child Abuse Prediction Model Fails Poor Families, WIRED (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/excerpt-from-automating-inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/YKX4-HYC2] [hereinafter Eubanks, A Child Abuse Prediction 
Model Fails Poor Families]. The county’s Department of Human Services publicly 
responded, claiming that “Ms. Eubanks is incorrect in her statement” and that “[i]n 
fact, it is Allegheny County policy that children classified by the AFST as being at the 
very highest risk level should be screened in for investigation unless a supervisor 
deems this unnecessary.” Press Release, Marc Cherna, Dir., Dep’t of Human Servs., 
DHS Response to Automated Inequality by Virginia Eubanks (Jan. 31, 2018), 
http://www.alleghenycounty.us/Human-Services/News-
Events/Accomplishments/Allegheny-Family-Screening-Tool.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/L35X-H24U].  As Eubanks pointed out in reply, the distinction 
drawn by the county is a hollow one: when a sufficiently high-risk score is generated, 
a “system has been automatically triggered if it will move forward without being 
overridden by a supervisor.” Virginia Eubanks, A Response to Allegheny County 
DHS (Feb. 16, 2018) (emphasis in original), https://virginia-
eubanks.com/2018/02/16/a-response-to-allegheny-county-dhs/ 
[https://perma.cc/5HJM-ZZC4].  Allegheny County has yet to release the threshold 
that triggers this chain of events. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 145, at 145. 
 156. See, e.g., Accenture, Predictive Analytics in Action - Marc Cherna, Allegheny 
County, PA, YOUTUBE (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gpb3G31l3lM [https://perma.cc/P3BX-WYU5] 
(“It’s only the first step of our predictive analytics.  Its controversial, predictive 
analytics, so we wanted to start with something that is really pretty straightforward, 
and then we’re going into things that are a little bit more difficult, like preventing 
child abuse, because we can tell at birth that there’s a good likelihood that 
somebody’s going to be in the system, but how do you do preventive services in a way 
that’s not stigmatizing, that doesn’t violate people’s rights, that is helpful, and that’s 
the challenge that we’re doing a lot of community work around, figuring out how to 
do that piece.”); Marc Cherna, We Will Use All Resources to Keep Children Safe, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 23, 2018), http://www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/letters/2018/03/23/We-will-use-all-resources-to-keep-children-
safe/stories/201803230094 [https://perma.cc/D7R8-36WK]. 
 157. See Richard Wexler, Pittsburgh Misuses Big Data to Target Poor Children for 
Abuse Investigations, YOUTH TODAY (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://youthtoday.org/2018/03/pittsburgh-misuses-big-data-to-target-poor-children-
for-foster-care/ [https://perma.cc/CCP5-BGXA] (arguing that a model that brands 
“every infant with a scarlet number at birth, a number that will even affect the 
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2. Eckerd Rapid Safety Feedback 
A Florida non-profit, Eckerd Kids, markets a tool called the 
“Rapid Safety Feedback” (RSF) process, which it says combines “a 
baseline of serious risk factors with real-time quality assurance.”158  
For agencies that contract to use RSF, Eckerd Kids supplies the 
“coaching, training and technical assistance, and fidelity reviews,” 
while its “tech partner, Mindshare, is building in the ‘prediction 
piece.’”159  As of early 2017, at least ten states were at some stage of 
development with Eckerd’s RSF, including Florida, Alaska, 
Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Tennessee, Ohio, 
and Illinois.160 
By December 2017, however, Illinois’s Department of Children 
and Family Services (DCFS) ended its trial of the RSF, citing the 
tool’s unreliability.161  DCFS Director Beverly Walker told the 
Chicago Tribune: “We are not doing the predictive analytics because 
it didn’t seem to be predicting much.”162  Reportedly, case workers 
using the tool were “alarmed and overwhelmed by alerts as thousands 
of children were rated as needing urgent protection.”163  According to 
press accounts, the RSF predicted a ninety percent or greater 
likelihood of death or injury for more than 4,100 children.164  For 
more than 350 children, case workers received alerts saying the child 
had a “100 percent chance of death or serious injury in the next two 
years.”165  At the same time, Illinois’s DCFS felt that the tool failed to 
flag some of the most serious cases.  In 2017, two young children, 
Semaj Crosby and Itachi Boyle, died within a month of one 
another.166  Neither was rated as “high risk” by the model.167  Upon 
 
number assigned to their children and grandchildren,” may be “inherently 
unethical”). 
 158. John Kelly, Rapid Safety Feedback’s Rapid Ascent, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE 
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-2/rapid-safety-
feedbacks-rapid-ascent [https://perma.cc/Y467-CUE2]. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. David Jackson & Gary Marx, Data Mining Program Designed to Predict 
Child Abuse Proves Unreliable, DCFS Says, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-dcfs-eckerd-met-20171206-
story.html [https://perma.cc/VY4B-QL8J]. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  Responding to inquiries in the wake of Illinois’s discontinuance of its trial, 
an Eckerd spokesperson stated: “We all agree that we could have done a better job 
with that language.  I admit it is confusing.” Id. 
 166. Id. 
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review, Illinois officials found that the data fed into the model from 
its case management system for each of these children was “riddled 
with error.”168 
III. ASSESSING THE MODELS 
As child protective agencies push ahead with efforts to implement 
predictive analytics, the question arises: what role should these tools 
play in child protective work?  Proponents of incorporating predictive 
analytic tools into child welfare decision-making argue that these 
tools will help agencies make better decisions more consistently, and 
reduce bias.169  But predictive algorithms are built on data that 
reflects the existing problems in the child welfare system.  They are 
the result of myriad human choices, many of which implicate 
important value judgments about the way the child welfare system 
should work.  Unless careful attention is paid at every stage of 
development and use, predictive analytics risk not only papering over 
existing problems in the child welfare system, but also introducing 
new risks for families. 
Some of the most important risks predictive analytics present can 
be categorized along three axes: accuracy, fairness, and misuse.170  
First, these tools incorporate data that itself is riddled with error, and 
may introduce new errors through the way the models are designed.  
Second, algorithmic prediction presents serious fairness concerns.  
Algorithms can perpetuate or magnify historical patterns of bias, their 
use of individual data in these models may implicate data privacy, and 
they can work to erode necessary transparency.   Finally, predictive 
models are subject to misuse.  Users may overestimate the capabilities 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. For example, Walter Smith Jr., a deputy director of Allegheny County’s 
Office of Children, Youth, and Families has argued that “[w]e know there are racially 
biased decisions made” in current child welfare practice; he continued:  
There are all kinds of biases.  If I’m a screener and I grew up in an alcoholic 
family, I might weigh a parent using alcohol more heavily.  If I had a parent 
who was violent, I might care more about that.  What predictive analytics 
provides is an opportunity to more uniformly and evenly look at all those 
variables.  
Dan Hurley, Can an Algorithm Tell When Kids Are in Danger?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/magazine/can-an-algorithm-tell-when-
kids-are-in-danger.html [https://perma.cc/42XL-F7GD]. 
 170. This Article does not intend to provide an exhaustive list of all the issues 
presented by the advent of predictive analytics. 
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of these tools and allow their predictions to take on outsize 
importance or be used in ways for which they were not intended.  The 
following Part describes these risks. 
A. Accuracy 
The first area of concern raised by the advent of predictive 
analytics is whether and to what degree they provide accurate 
predictions. The introduction of predictive analytic tools is only 
justified if they in fact serve to improve decision-making.  The 
existence of error in the underlying data and the difficulty of 
identifying appropriate outcomes to measure lead to serious 
questions about these tools’ accuracy.  Even with perfect data, 
probabilistic predictive tools will make classification errors, 
identifying some families as high-risk when they are not, and some as 
low-risk when the opposite may be true.  Developers may be able to 
prioritize one type of error over another, meaning that fundamental 
value judgments about the way child welfare systems should work 
may be baked in to the models. And these models may discount or 
ignore changes to real-world conditions, leaving them making 
“zombie predictions” that do not track reality.  For all these reasons, 
careful attention must be paid to the accuracy of these models and 
how the errors they make implicate fundamental systemic concerns. 
The following section details some of these accuracy concerns. 
1. Flaws in the Data: Garbage In, Garbage Out 
The foundation of any predictive model is the data on which the 
model is trained and is meant to analyze.  If there are flaws in the 
underlying data, those flaws will be translated into the output of the 
model.  Algorithms are only as good as their data — simply put: 
“garbage in, garbage out.”171 
In the case of child welfare predictive tools, there is reason to be 
extremely concerned about the level of pure error present in the data 
being fed into the algorithm.  Data in administrative systems is 
entered, initially, by humans.  Names, addresses, or other vital 
information may be wrong, information from one individual may be 
erroneously tied to another, old and outdated information may 
persist, or information may be missing altogether.172  Error that 
 
 171. Tal Z. Zarsky, An Analytic Challenge: Discrimination Theory in the Age of 
Predictive Analytics, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 11, 24 (2017). 
 172. I can easily think of a handful of examples from my own practice.  One client, 
who was incarcerated in federal prison for a number of years, was listed on all his 
338 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
changes an important input into a risk prediction model for a 
particular child makes the tool useless to decision-makers.173  The 
Illinois DCFS’s short-lived experiment with Eckerd’s predictive tool 
provides a stark example of this problem.  The 2017 deaths of Semaj 
Crosby and Itachi Boyle provided a window into what is likely 
widespread error in the underlying data.174  When the agency looked 
at their records, they found that the tool had not predicted that these 
children were at risk, in part because the Department’s “automated 
case-tracking system was riddled with data entry errors” in both 
cases.175 The reverse problem is easy to imagine as well.  Error in the 
data that artificially inflates a child’s score could lead the agency 
down a destructive path.176 
2. Error in the Model: Not All Errors Are Created Equal 
Even if perfect data were available, any predictive tool would still 
produce errors because models are simply statistical predictions — 
not perfect visions of the future.  The inevitability of error raises two 
issues.  First is the question of how the model prioritizes the various 
types of errors.  Second is the question of what the stakes of a 
potential error tell us about the model itself.  Each concern is 
considered in turn. 
 
prison forms with his name misspelled and his first and last names reversed; this 
made even simple things, like setting up a telephone conference with him, 
inordinately difficult.  Another client lost out on months of visitation with her young 
son, derailing her reunification efforts at a critical time, because a referee located an 
old order of protection in an online system kept by the courts, which appeared there 
as active.  In reality, that order of protection had been vacated more than a year 
earlier.  Resolving this issue took weeks, multiple trips to the courthouse, and reams 
of paper — all because of a data error.  Similarly, the Allegheny County team 
described how their efforts to validate their model against hospital data were 
hampered when they encountered missing data in records they received from the 
Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh. VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 20 n.14. 
 173. See Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, How We Analyzed the COMPAS 
Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-
algorithm [https://perma.cc/Z9L9-HZ2H] (finding, in a study of the criminal justice 
COMPAS tool, that “sometimes people’s names or dates of birth were incorrectly 
entered in some records — which led to incorrect matches between an individual’s 
COMPAS score and his or her criminal records.  We attempted to determine how 
many records were affected.  In a random sample of 400 cases, we found an error rate 
of 3.75 percent (CI: +/- 1.8 percent).”). 
 174. See Jackson & Marx, supra note 161. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Kahenman & Tversky, supra note 50, at 166 (discussing how framing 
impacts decision-making); WHITE & WALSH, supra note 56, at 4–5 (describing how 
bias impacts decision-making in child protection risk assessment). 
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First, we may all agree that prediction errors are of concern, but 
how we value them may vary.  Not all errors are created equal.  In the 
case of models that purport to predict risk to a particular child, these 
errors will consist of false positives (e.g., classifying some individuals 
as high risk when they are not), and false negatives (e.g., classifying 
others as at low risk when the reverse is true).  When models that 
purport to predict individual-level risk are used, these two types of 
error lead to different potential harms: a false positive may lead to 
unwarranted state intervention, possibly even to family separation 
that otherwise would not have occurred.  A false negative, on the 
other hand, could lead the agency to fail to intervene when it should 
have. 
Understanding that different types of error may implicate different 
harms, developers may have latitude to optimize the tool for one type 
of error over another.177  This might appear at first blush to be a 
technical decision for model-developers to make, but it in fact 
implicates one of the most fundamental questions in this field.  It is a 
new battleground for the same debate scholars have engaged in 
throughout the development of the modern “child welfare” system: 
how to calibrate the fine balance of rights at stake when the state 
intervenes in family life.178 
Often, the risks of false negatives are over-emphasized while the 
risks of false positives are underappreciated.  Take, for example, the 
Second Circuit’s description of the choice protective services workers 
face when investigating a family: “If they err in interrupting parental 
custody, they may be accused of infringing the parents’ constitutional 
rights.  If they err in not removing the child, they risk injury to the 
child and may be accused of infringing the child’s rights.”179  Or this 
description of the possible risks of error, which appears in a 2008 
article: “In child welfare, these classification errors are of concern 
because false negatives can be dangerous to the child, while false 
 
 177. In fact, scholars have suggested that it would be impossible to “be fair in both 
ways at the same time.” Sam Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer Program Used for 
Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not 
That Clear., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-
algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-
propublicas/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3ff410f6c794 [https://perma.cc/8N7D-
QK64].  See also infra notes 213–16 and accompanying text. 
 178. See generally MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 181–212 (2005) (discussing the shift in child welfare towards termination of 
parental rights and adoption as goals). 
 179. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 596 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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positives can result in poor targeting of agency resources.”180  While 
not untrue, these statements of the potential risks set up a false 
dichotomy, placing parents’ and children’s interests on opposite sides 
when they are much more intertwined than these descriptions imply.  
The conception of parents as benefiting exclusively from family 
integrity and children benefiting exclusively from separation, 
discounts the danger posed to the child and family by the false 
positive.  We must be concerned not only with “poor targeting of 
agency resources,” but also with the serious harms that families 
experience from unnecessary or unwarranted system involvement.  
This is obvious in the case of an unnecessary child removal,181 but we 
cannot disregard the harms that an unnecessary visit by a child 
protective worker can cause.  The experience of being visited by a 
child protective worker can be destabilizing and disempowering.  
Case workers enter private family spaces, bringing with them 
accusations and judgments about the parents and their abilities or 
worth.  Families often are forced apart to speak with the case worker 
separately, and are asked to open cabinets and drawers to prove that 
there is food and clothing in the home — regardless of the substance 
of the allegation.182  Neighbors often are interviewed or questioned 
regarding the habits of the parents or children, destroying a family’s 
sense of autonomy and privacy.183  This experience can leave parents 
and children with the feeling that their home is no longer a safe space, 
that their family is at imminent risk of being torn apart, and that their 
worst fears have been confirmed: that, as many parents often secretly 
 
 180. D’Andrade, supra note 48, at 37. 
 181. See Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, N.Y.U. REV. LAW & SOC. 
CHANGE (forthcoming 2019). In the throes of the family separation crisis created by 
the Trump Administration, more than 12,600 mental health professionals signed a 
petition summarizing the serious harms that even brief disruptions in families can 
cause:  
From decades of research and direct clinical experience, we know that the 
impact of disrupted attachment manifests not only in overwhelming fear and 
panic at the time of the separation, but that there is a strong likelihood that 
these children’s behavioral, psychological, interpersonal, and cognitive 
trajectories will also be affected.   
Petition from Mental Health Professionals: Stop Border Separation of Children from 
Parents!, CHILD’S WORLD AMERICA, https://childsworldamerica.org/stop-border-
separation/stop-border-separation-text-preview/ [https://perma.cc/XU53-UQTB]. 
 182. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the 
Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 436–37, 441 (2005). 
 183. Id. at 431 n.38. 
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worry, they are not good enough, are not doing a good job as 
parents.184 
Throughout the various stages of predictive model design and 
implementation, and especially during the model training stage, 
developers may choose to optimize predictive tools to allow for more 
of one type of error than another.185  This is a value judgment 
embedded deep within each model.  For this reason, it is important 
that communities in which predictive analytics are being developed 
understand the models’ error rates and can assess the ways that the 
developers have weighted different types of error. 
Complicating this prospect is the difficulty of assessing whether a 
model is making truly accurate predictions.  There are a number of 
problems in assessing the accuracy of models that purport to make 
individual-level predictions of future risk to a particular child.  First, 
as discussed above, algorithmic tools must be designed to predict 
well-defined “outcome variables.”186  The child welfare system has 
never successfully defined child maltreatment, making outcome 
selection extremely difficult.  Definitions of “neglect” are notoriously 
vague.187  They can range from a child missing school to severe 
deprivations of basic life necessities, and everything in between.188  
 
 184. See, e.g., Brief for the N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Family Def. Clinic et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26–27, Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) 
(No. 09–1454 and 09–1478), 
http://www.familydefensecenter.net/images/stories/NYU_School_of_Law_Family_De
fense_Clinic.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK3T-3BRF] (“The interview may undermine 
family integrity and trust and suggest that it is not safe to trust parents.”).  These 
concerns may be particularly acute in situations involving domestic violence. See 
Brief of Battered Women’s Res. Ctr. et al. in Support of Respondents at 13–14, 
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (No. 09–1454 and 09–1478), 
http://www.familydefensecenter.net/images/stories/Battered_Womens_Resouce_Cent
er.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RFB-ZX39]; see also Gillingham, supra note 113, at 1052 
(arguing that labelling people in particular ways has consequences for their 
construction of identity and the ensuing subject positions offered to them by such 
constructions). 
 185. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 116, at 698 (“Real-world stakeholders rarely view 
different kinds of errors as holding the same normative valence.  Therefore, analysts 
frequently rely on tuning parameters to implement these asymmetries.”). 
 186. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“The legal issues posed by the State’s petition [for removal on the basis 
of abuse or neglect] are neither simple nor easily defined.  The standard is imprecise 
and open to the subjective values of the judge.”); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of 
Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal 
Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 706 (1998). 
 188. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2018). 
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For this reason, neglect often is confused with “parenting while 
poor.”189 
Even were we to agree on some well-defined notion of “child 
maltreatment,” however, it is unlikely that developers could identify a 
data point or a constellation of data points that accurately reflect 
when and where maltreatment takes place in the real world. 
Accordingly, predictive analytics developers have been forced to 
identify proxies for child maltreatment — values that will stand in for 
the real thing. But good proxies are hard to find.  “Substantiation,”190 
for instance, is not a good measure.191  Substantiation is influenced by 
bias, determined based on an insufficient legal standard, and does not 
distinguish well between outcomes for individual children.  The 
population whose cases are substantiated is necessarily dependent on 
the population for whom referrals for investigation are made.192  The 
legal standard for “substantiation” — generally something similar to 
“some credible evidence” — is too low to be meaningfully tied to 
“truth.”  Children whose siblings may have experienced abuse or 
neglect, but who themselves did not, may be included in substantiated 
reports, and research has shown that myriad factors unrelated to 
actual child maltreatment may influence substantiation decisions.193  
Such a measure, therefore, is replete with inaccuracies and bias, and 
does not serve as a useful proxy for real-world maltreatment. 
In the case of the Allegheny County algorithm, for example, the 
developers chose two flawed proxies for the tool to predict: re-
referral and placement.194  Re-referral, subject as it is to the 
 
 189. See Eubanks, A Child Abuse Prediction Model Fails Poor Families, supra 
note 155. 
 190. Substantiation refers to the agency’s initial finding that there is some basis to 
the report of child maltreatment. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Gillingham, supra note 113, at 1049–52. 
 192. See supra notes 11–23 and accompanying text.  As Erin Dalton, director of 
Allegheny County’s Office of Data Analysis, Research and Evaluation stated, “[w]ho 
we investigate is not a function of who abuses.  It’s a function of who gets reported.” 
Hurley, supra note 169. 
 193. Gillingham, supra note 113, at 1049–50 (“The term ‘substantiation’ may be 
applied to cases in more than one way, as stipulated by legislation and departmental 
procedures.  It might be applied in cases not only where there is evidence of 
maltreatment, but also where children are assessed as being ‘in need of protection’ or 
‘at risk.’  Substantiation in some jurisdictions may be an important factor in the 
determination of eligibility for services and so concerns about a child or family’s need 
for support may underpin a decision to substantiate rather than evidence of 
maltreatment.  Practitioners may also be unclear about what they are required to 
substantiate, either the risk of maltreatment or actual maltreatment, or perhaps 
both.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 194. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
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idiosyncratic conception of what constitutes “maltreatment” on the 
part of the community-member who makes the call, cannot be tied 
directly to true harm.  What’s more, community referral is one of the 
decision points in the system where the most disproportionality is 
evident, indicating that biases play a role in these decisions.195  
Similarly, placement is a manifestation not necessarily of risk to the 
child, but of the myriad decisions of the existing system, most made 
on the basis of vague standards and under the influence of bias. For 
these reasons, it may be difficult to assess whether individual-
prediction models have weighted error properly. 
This discussion leads to the question: if models will inevitably 
produce errors, is it responsible to use them to make individual-level 
predictions?  The debate about optimizing for false positives or false 
negatives is a vital one, but the more important question is whether 
these models can make predictions on the individual level that are 
accurate enough to justify the stakes of any error.  Where predictions 
are geared toward individuals’ future behavior, the stakes are 
inexorably higher than they would be for population-level prediction.  
Consider, for example, the risk posed by a false positive prediction 
that an individual child is at high risk of harm.  This false prediction 
may set off a series of events with dire consequences: if the model 
being used is like Allegheny County’s AFST, the child and his or her 
family may become the subjects of a child protective investigation in 
which they otherwise might not be involved.  This could lead to 
trauma and even removal.  Now compare this individual false positive 
with a population-level false positive.  If a model were built to assess 
where families are likely to need preventive services, for example, the 
result of any given family being erroneously included in the “high 
risk” set results in only a slightly higher likelihood that an agency will 
direct preventive services toward their community, services that will 
act to better support that community. 
3. Zombie Predictions 
Predictive analytic tools also may fail to account for resiliency and 
change over time.  Just like SDM tools, predictive analytic algorithms 
tend to rely on negative risk factors, to the exclusion of protective, 
 
 195. Allegheny County, for instance, has stated that most of the disproportionality 
present in its system can be attributed to disproportionate rates of referral of black 
families. See ALLEGHENY CTY. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 72, at 2–3.  In 
this way, substituting re-referral for maltreatment as the outcome variable serves to 
entrench and to magnify the biases that lead to disproportionality. See Eubanks, 
supra note 154, at 155; see also infra Section III.B.1. 
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positive factors.196  Of particular concern in child welfare are tools 
that rely on a parent’s own history of placement in foster care as a 
child.197  These tools tend to project static conditions from a family’s 
past into the future, without considering rehabilitative actions taken 
or resiliency-supporting factors that may be present. 
These tools pose particular risks when on-the-ground conditions 
have changed.  Scholars John Logan Koepke and David G. Robinson 
warn of the risk of “zombie predictions.”198  These are predictions 
that revive old data and outcomes for a system that has undergone 
reforms, which results in tools that systematically overestimate risk 
and potentially undercut reform efforts.199  In child welfare, there has 
been much discussion about a renewed focus on prevention 
nationwide, surrounding the recent enactment of the Family First 
Prevention Services Act in early 2018.200  As reforms get underway in 
line with this renewed focus, we must be particularly cognizant of the 
risks of “zombie predictions.” 
B. Fairness 
The second axis along which concerns arise with predictive 
analytics relates to fairness.  First and most importantly, algorithmic 
prediction can perpetuate, magnify, and even shroud from public view 
the pernicious effects of bias.  Second, the use of individuals’ 
information in these big data systems may raise privacy concerns. 
And third, algorithmic decision-making risks reducing necessary 
transparency on the workings of government systems, which in turn 
makes oversight more difficult and degrades public confidence in the 
legitimacy of such systems.  The following section discusses each of 
these concerns. 
 
 196. See, e.g., VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, app. at 37–43. 
 197. See, e.g., Lindsay Williams & Kristine Monroe, Ohio Dep’t of Job & Fam. 
Servs., Using Predictive Analytics to Identify High Risk Child Welfare Cases, OHIO 
CASA 2017 CELEBRATE KIDS! CONFERENCE (Sept. 20, 2017),  
https://www.ohiocasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/T18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C7JR-MHQ6]. 
 198. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment 
and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1725 (2018). 
 199. Id. at 1730. 
 200. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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1. Bias in, Bias out 
Just as errors in data invalidate the predictions that an algorithm 
provides based on that data, so too does bias in data infect the results 
of predictive algorithms.  In other words, “bias in, bias out.”201  
Algorithms trained on data representing historical biases will inherit 
those biases.202  Where the data fed into the algorithm represents the 
“prejudicial or biased behavior of prior decision makers,” the 
inclusion of that data in the model will cause the algorithm to “learn 
from the bad example” of the past and import those same biases into 
the future.203 More than simply inheriting existing bias, these 
algorithms may also “launder” that bias, giving an “aura of logical 
inevitability” to historical patterns or to the status quo in the form of 
the predictive model’s authoritative, “clean, mathematical 
apparatus.”204 
In the child welfare context, a long history of over-surveillance and 
over-policing of poor communities and communities of color means 
that those communities are disproportionately represented in any 
child welfare or criminal justice data set.  This means that, without 
careful attention to the details of tool development and training, 
algorithms trained on these biased data sets are likely to rate 
individuals coming from these communities as higher risk, while 
systematically discounting the risk of wealthier, white families.205  
 
 201. KINGSLEY & DI MAURO-NAVA, supra note 127, at 8. 
 202. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 116, at 687 (“The efficacy of data mining is 
fundamentally dependent on the quality of the data from which it attempts to draw 
useful lessons.  If these data capture the prejudicial or biased behavior of prior 
decision makers, data mining will learn from the bad example that these decisions 
set.”).  Anupam Chander refers to this as the “problem of viral discrimination,” 
writing that “algorithms simply compound the errors of the past . . . . Algorithms 
trained or operated on a real-world data set that necessarily reflects existing 
discrimination may well replicate that discrimination.” Chander, supra note 10, at 
1036. 
 203. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 116, at 687. 
 204. Dave Gershgorn, Companies Are on the Hook if Their Hiring Algorithms 
Are Biased, QUARTZ (Oct. 22, 2018), https://qz.com/1427621/companies-are-on-the-
hook-if-their-hiring-algorithms-are-biased/ [https://perma.cc/HHL4-XE87]. 
 205. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 116, at 684–86 (“If a sample includes a 
disproportionate representation of a particular class (more or less than its actual 
incidence in the overall population), the results of an analysis of that sample may 
skew in favor of or against the over- or underrepresented class.”).  In critiquing 
machine learning mainly in finance and employment, scholars have also warned of 
the reverse risk — that bias can result from a community’s relative absence from the 
data set. Cf.  Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/M67J-
CY2V] (“Because not all data is created or even collected equally, there are ‘signal 
problems’ in big-data sets — dark zones or shadows where some citizens and 
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Even proponents of extant predictive analytic tools acknowledge that 
they may replicate existing inequities.  Erin Dalton, director of 
Allegheny County’s Office of Data Analysis, Research and 
Evaluation has acknowledged that the AFST “definitely 
oversample[s] the poor.”206  Ms. Dalton stated even more explicitly 
when speaking to the New York Times, “It’s a conundrum . . . .  All of 
the data on which the algorithm is based is biased.  Black children are, 
relatively speaking, over-surveilled in our systems, and white children 
are under-surveilled.”207 
This problem is compounded by the fact that predictive algorithms 
incorporate and learn from multiple data sets, each of which is 
infected by bias.  For example, predictive tools might learn from data 
in the criminal and juvenile justice systems; but this means that the 
biases and disproportionality present in those systems are imported 
into child welfare risk assessments.208  Similarly, historical patterns of 
housing discrimination and poverty concentration mean that even 
facially neutral variables, such as zip code, can serve as stand-ins for 
decades of bias. By relying on such variables, we risk magnifying 
these problems.209 
The inclusion of even facially neutral inputs that import protected 
variables like race into the algorithm’s predictions risks not only 
building historical patterns of bias into the algorithms’ predictions 
about the future, but also obscuring the true impact those protected 
variables have.210  One way this problem manifests is in “omitted 
variable bias.”211  This term refers to the problem presented when an 
important, influential variable — for instance, race or socioeconomic 
 
communities are overlooked or underrepresented.”).  There is a similar corollary 
present in child welfare data, as the relative absence of white and wealthy families in 
historical data means that children from those communities risk being systematically 
under-counted and underserved, while black and poor families continue to be 
victimized by the system’s harsh spotlight. 
 206. Eubanks, A Child Abuse Prediction Model Fails Poor Families, supra note 
155. 
 207. Hurley, supra note 169. 
 208. See KINGSLEY & DI MAURO-NAVA, supra note 127, at 10. (“[R]isk models are 
extremely likely to ‘rediscover’ protected variables through their close correlation 
with other factors. (For example, in many communities, a client’s race will be highly 
correlated with her zip code of residence.)”); see, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-
Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 803, 837–38 (2014). 
 209. See Starr, supra note 208, at 838. 
 210. See Chander, supra note 10, at 1037–39. 
 211. See, e.g., GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY SCIENTIFIC 
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 168–82 (1994). 
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status — is absent during the training stage.  The absence of that 
variable, despite its outsize influence on the likelihood of the 
outcome, will cause other, correlated variables to take on weight that 
they do not warrant, acting as a sort of algorithmic Trojan Horse by 
importing the effect of the missing variable while obscuring its role.212  
For this reason, the exclusion of vital data, like information 
identifying individuals as members of protected classes, could itself 
lead to discriminatory predictions.213 
The Allegheny development team’s description of the role of race 
in the AFST raises questions about whether race has a larger impact 
than acknowledged.214  The accompanying ethical review, in fact, 
concedes that “potentially reinforcing” racial disparities in the 
model’s underlying data may lead the model to “overstate the actual 
risk status of a child or family.”215  This review does little to assuage 
concern over racial bias in the algorithm, instead finding that such 
bias is not problematic in the child welfare context because — 
according to the authors — child welfare system involvement, unlike 
criminal justice system involvement, is designed to be 
rehabilitative.216   As this Article has shown, however, the 
 
 212. See, e.g., Omitted Variable Bias: A Comprehensive Econometrics Review, 
ALBERT (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.albert.io/blog/omitted-variable-bias-
econometrics-review/ [https://perma.cc/Q79M-W8S6]. 
 213. See Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of 
Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning 5 (Stanford Univ., Working 
Paper, Sept. 11, 2018), https://5harad.com/papers/fair-ml.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HLP-
2Y7U]. 
 214. VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 15, 29–30 (“Of course, it is 
important to note that not including race is not to imply that race does not feature 
into the model because there are other predictors that are highly correlated with race 
due to potentially institutionalized racial bias (e.g., criminal justice history) that 
would imply that race is still a factor.”). 
 215. TIM DARE & EILEEN GAMBRILL, ALLEGHENY CTY. DEP’T. OF HUMAN SERVS., 
ETHICAL ANALYSIS: PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS AT CALL SCREENING FOR 
ALLEGHENY COUNTY 6 (Mar. 2017), https://www.alleghenycountyanalytics.us/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Developing-Predictive-Risk-Models-package-with-cover-1-
to-post-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MXK-GY77]. 
 216. See id. (“We think it matters in the AFST case that while a history of 
engagement with child protection services may lead the AFST to overstate the actual 
risk status of a child or family, the intervention which flows from that classification is 
designed and intended precisely a) to identify that family or individual’s actual risk 
status through home visits and professional judgement, and b) to address in so far as 
possible any risk factors which are found to exist. It matters, ethically, this is to say, 
that a high risk score will trigger further investigation and positive intervention rather 
than merely more intervention and greater vulnerability to punitive response.  We 
believe, that is, that the fact that the AFST will prompt further detailed inquiry into a 
family’s situation and that any intervention is designed to assist gives grounds to 
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rehabilitative goal of child welfare systems often falls short in 
practice, and even brief interactions with system actors may be 
destabilizing.217  We must be vigilant any time the gaze of the state is 
focused on an individual, even for purportedly “beneficial” purposes, 
but especially so when that gaze is focused as a result of the person’s 
race.218 
2. Privacy Concerns 
Individual data is being tracked constantly.  Our locations are 
monitored through our phones, our purchases logged, and our 
interests catalogued and traded among corporations.219  Generally, 
we expect people to “police their own data disclosures,” relying on a 
privacy model that prioritizes individual choice and is based on 
consent.220  But when the government obtains and uses our data in 
ways we may not have expected — such as to influence decisions 
about the future integrity of our families — questions arise about 
whether we as a community are comfortable with this new use. 
Information science scholar Helen Nissenbaum has put forward a 
theory to explain the great variability among situations and 
communities in concepts of data privacy, termed “contextual 
integrity.”221  According to Nissenbaum’s theory, what causes anxiety 
and resistance — what “raise[s] privacy hackles” — is not the sharing 
of data in and of itself, but moments when personal information flows 
in ways we may not expect, flouting established “informational 
norms.”222  With predictive analytics, individuals may have expected 
their data to reside with or be used by health systems or social 
support systems, but may not have expected it to end up in a powerful 
algorithm that scores their family for “risk” and leads to the knock of 
 
think the model is not vulnerable to the legitimate concerns generated by the 
existence of disparities in data used in punitive contexts.”). Id. 
 217. See, e.g., supra notes 178–83. 
 218. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 n.24 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[O]f all 
tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most 
oppressive . . . . (T)hose who torment us for our own good will torment us without 
end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.”) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 219. See, e.g., Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap, 42 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 254, 292 (2018). 
 220. Id. at 291–92. 
 221. Helen Nissenbaum, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 127 (2010). 
 222. Id. at 3, 127, 148; see also Gilman & Green, supra note 219, at 295 (describing 
Nissenbaum’s theory). 
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a child protective worker at their door.  This use may violate notions 
of what an “appropriate information flow” looks like and thereby 
raise a “red flag.”223 
For some of the information included in predictive analytic tools, 
we may believe that informed consent is required before data can be 
used in new and different ways.224  Child protective agencies put 
forward various arguments as to why there are no problems with 
consent when they deploy predictive tools, most focusing on the idea 
that the agency is using data that already is available to it or to its 
associated governmental entities.225  There is no guarantee, however, 
that agencies will not reach beyond government boundaries into the 
wider world of data being collected and mined every day about 
everyone.226 
Even assuming that child welfare agencies confine themselves to 
data already available to government systems, there is a strong 
argument that extracting individual data, in many cases, violates the 
notion of informed consent.  In her recent book, scholar Khiara 
Bridges argues that “poor mothers have been deprived of privacy 
rights.”227  Bridges outlines two ways of understanding this argument, 
a “moderate” claim and a “strong” claim.228  The moderate claim is 
that although poor women may nominally have a right a to privacy, 
the practical effect of our system results in “no effective privacy 
rights”229  The strong claim, by contrast, argues that poor mothers 
have no privacy rights at all.230 
In line with Bridges’ distinction between the moderate and strong 
claims, there are two ways to view consent, or lack thereof, when 
individual data ends up in public systems.  In accordance with 
Bridges’ moderate claim, we can conceive of a family’s (in particular, 
a mother’s) data as having been handed over as payment in a barter 
for public goods or services.231  When a mother receives public goods 
 
 223. Nissenbaum, supra note 221, at 148–50; Gilman & Green, supra note 219, at 
295. 
 224. Nissenbaum, supra note 221, at 145–47 (discussing “transmission principles”). 
 225. See DARE & GAMBRILL, supra note 215, at 3. 
 226. David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 42 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2016) (“Indeed, government agencies routinely buy 
information from data brokers to round out their own profiles.”). 
 227. KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 11 (2017). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional 
Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 939 (1995) (noting that public 
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or services, the argument goes, she implicitly consents to her data 
being shared with the government as part of the cost of those services.  
However, when viewed in the context of the state’s coercive child 
welfare authority and removal power, that barter begins to look 
precipitously inequitable.  Poor parents are not free and willing 
participants in this market — the specter of their child’s removal 
hangs overhead.  A poor parent who refuses to access available public 
services as a way of “preserving a sphere of individual privacy from 
government interference”232 risks opening her home to a different, 
involuntary state invasion: a child protective investigator knocking on 
the door.233  No matter what “choice” this parent makes her data 
ends up in the system.  As to Bridges’ strong claim, if poor parents are 
thought to lack privacy rights altogether, voluntary consent simply 
cannot exist.  Regardless of which lens one chooses to view the 
gathering of this data, then, there are serious questions as to whether 
the state’s receipt and control of the data is the result of any kind of 
satisfactory consent. 
3. Transparency 
The fact that many child welfare predictive analytic tools are being 
developed by private companies for public systems leads to another 
significant risk — lack of transparency.  As is already evident in the 
criminal justice sphere, private companies regularly and successfully 
assert trade secret protections to shield predictive algorithms from 
public scrutiny.234  Courts have not required that individuals 
 
assistance recipients “barter away their rights in exchange for benefits”); Gilman, 
supra note 76, at 1396–1400 (describing the litany of privacy invasions the poor must 
endure in exchange for their receipt of public benefits). 
 232. Roberts, supra note 231, at 939. 
 233. BRIDGES, supra note 227, at 9–10, 66, 84–86.  Even progressive state laws that 
recognize that poverty alone should not be considered neglect provide for a finding 
of neglect where a parent willingly foregoes available public services.  See, e.g., N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 2018) (“‘Neglected child’ means a child less 
than eighteen years of age whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been 
impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of 
his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum 
degree of care in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or 
education . . . though [the parent or other person legally responsible is] financially 
able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 234. See Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 683–86 
(2018); Jeff Larson & Julia Angwin, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/HT9G-FC3E] (“Northpointe’s software is among the 
most widely used assessment tools in the country.  The company does not publicly 
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negatively affected by risk assessment tools be provided with 
information about how those tools function, even when fundamental 
constitutional interests are at stake.235 
In-house development by child welfare authorities is no promise of 
transparency either.  Although the Allegheny County team has been 
a leader in openness about its project, the team already publicly 
disclaimed any true ability to explain the inner workings of its 
predictive model, stating that “even researchers cannot interpret the 
final list of variables and their corresponding weights.”236  This 
despite the fact that the team commendably, if perhaps nominally, 
prioritized “explainability” during the model-selection phase.237  
Ultimately, the team also decided to add a less transparent, but 
(according to the researchers) slightly more accurate, algorithmic 
model to their tool.238  Similarly, although New York City’s ACS 
boasts of its in-house development and commitment to “using 
[predictive analytics] carefully, ethically, and thoughtfully,”239 the 
agency has already begun employing a predictive analytics tool, yet 
little information has been made publicly-available. 
Transparency — not just about the inputs and outputs, but that 
provides visibility on the human decisions being made at every stage 
of the development process — is vital for a number of reasons.  First 
 
disclose the calculations used to arrive at defendants’ risk scores, so it is not possible 
for either defendants or the public to see what might be driving the disparity.  (On 
Sunday, Northpointe gave ProPublica the basics of its future-crime formula — which 
includes factors such as education levels, and whether a defendant has a job.  It did 
not share the specific calculations, which it said are proprietary.)”). 
 235. In State v. Loomis, a 2016 case decided by Wisconsin’s Supreme Court, 
defendant Eric Loomis challenged his sentencing court’s reliance on a risk 
assessment tool, COMPAS, on due process grounds. 881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 
2016).  Information about how COMPAS produced its risk score was withheld from 
Loomis because its developer “considers COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a 
trade secret” and therefore “does not disclose how the risk scores are determined or 
how the factors are weighed.” Id. at 760.  The Wisconsin court sanctioned this 
secrecy, finding that Loomis was not denied due process by the sentencing court’s 
consideration of his risk score.  Id.  The court distinguished Loomis’s case from 
others in which “the court relied on information the defendant did not have any 
opportunity to refute, supplement or explain.” Id. at 761.  The Court was satisfied by 
the fact that Loomis could “at least review and challenge the resulting risk scores set 
forth in the report attached to the PSI.” Id. 
 236. VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 14. 
 237. Id. (discussing alternative methods considered for constructing their 
algorithm, and citing as one weakness of these alternate approaches their tendency 
“to be [a] ‘black box’ in the sense that it is more difficult to understand why a family 
received a high score”). 
 238. See id. at 35 (discussing addition of a “random forest model” to the tool). 
 239. See Automating Inequality Panel, supra note 138. 
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is accuracy, as open-source tools generally are more accurate and 
contain fewer errors.240  Second is oversight, as without visibility on 
each of the “levers” developers adjusted and the decisions they made 
throughout the tool’s creation, advocates and oversight bodies cannot 
fully assess whether a tool is being developed and utilized responsibly 
and in line with community values.241  Third is legitimacy, as 
shrouding these tools in secrecy — even if they are in fact valid, 
reliable, and useful — serves to undermine public confidence in their 
fairness and quality.242 
C. Misuse 
Predictive analytic tools may have some utility in child welfare,243 
but users of these tools must understand and acknowledge their 
limitations and guard against assigning their predictions undue 
influence in order to employ them responsibly.  If not carefully 
monitored, the production of algorithmic, individual risk scores might 
compromise the delicate constitutional balance necessary to protect 
child safety and respect the fundamental right of family integrity.  The 
following section details some of the ways that predictive analytics are 
vulnerable to misuse. 
1. Acknowledging Limitations 
No probabilistic tool can predict whether any given child will or 
will not experience abuse or neglect.244  These tools work on the level 
of averages, drawing upon probabilities and correlations.245  They 
cannot make predictions as to the source of any risk, whether it be 
one caregiver or another, an outside party, or environmental, nor can 
they predict risk in short time frames.  Both the Eckerd and 
Allegheny County tools, for example, predict risk to children over a 
period of two years.246  Such long-term predictions are of limited 
 
 240. Ram, supra note 234, at 687. 
 241. Id.; see also Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 145, at 129. 
 242. Ram, supra note 234, at 691. 
 243. See, e.g., YVONNE HUMENAY ROBERTS ET AL., CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN CHILD WELFARE 13 
(2018), https://caseyfamilypro-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/media/Considerations-for-
Applying-Predictive-Analytics-in-Child-Welfare.pdf [https://perma.cc/524W-BWGE] 
(identifying potential for predictive analytics to assist with “gap analysis, service 
evaluation, and service matching”). 
 244. See Starr, supra note 208, at 842. 
 245. See Ram, supra note 234, at 684 (discussing how a particular risk assessment 
algorithm works). 
 246. The research team responsible for Allegheny County’s AFST wrote:  
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utility in many child protective decisions, and are inappropriate in the 
context of the most important decisions, such as whether a child 
should remain at home with his or her parents. 
Long-term, generalized risk is not sufficient to warrant state 
intervention in a family. Although child neglect laws are troublingly 
broad and vague, to pass constitutional muster courts have asserted 
they must permit state intervention only upon the most limited terms 
practicable, focusing solely on true danger to children.247  To justify 
removing a child, for instance, risk to that child must be 
“imminent.”248 This imminence requirement is one way that courts 
have attempted to strike the delicate balance needed to protect the 
varied fundamental interests at stake in child protective cases.  In 
New York, for example, a finding of neglect must be based upon 
“proof of actual (or imminent danger of) physical, emotional or 
mental impairment to the child.”249 Danger to the child “must be near 
or impending, not merely possible.”250These time limitations ensure 
that the court, “in deciding whether to authorize state intervention, 
will focus on serious harm or potential harm to the child, not just on 
what might be deemed undesirable parental behavior.”251 
For these reasons, amorphous, long-term, probabilistic risk 
predictions simply do not map onto most of the decisions that child 
 
While there is not universal agreement on the degree to which the current 
clinical assessment at point of referral is focused on the longer-term risk of 
adverse events versus assessing the current crisis of alleged abuse or neglect, 
the research team and Allegheny County chose to design a model to predict 
long arc risk. 
VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 7–8.  Public reporting regarding the 
Eckerd system employed by Illinois and a number of other states makes clear that its 
algorithm also is focused on long-term risk:  
Illinois child care agencies told the Tribune they were alarmed by computer-
generated alerts like the one that said: “Please note that the two youngest 
children, ages 1 year and 4 years have been assigned a 99% probability by 
the Eckerd Rapid Safety Feedback metrics of serious harm or death in the 
next two years.”   
Jackson & Marx, supra note 161. 
 247. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357 (N.Y. 2004). 
 248. Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for 
Comprehensive, Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINE J. 
PUB. L. & POL’Y 141, 146 n.19 (2006) (collecting statutes requiring “imminent” or 
“immediate” risk to the child in order to justify removal). 
 249. Id. (emphasis added). 
 250. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §1012 (McKinney 2018). 
 251. Id. 
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welfare authorities and courts must make.  This disconnect highlights 
the tension in attempting to graft public health strategies onto the 
framework of the existing child welfare system.  To justify their 
approach, for example, the Allegheny County researchers attempt to 
compare their predictions to predictive risk modeling in health 
care.252  But this comparison only underscores how poorly predictive 
algorithms fit into many — if not all — of the decisions that must be 
made in the course of a child protective case under our current legal 
regime.  As things stand today, most child welfare systems are 
constructed to adhere to the “blame and cure” paradigm, wherein 
child welfare agencies investigate and respond to individualized 
reports of child maltreatment.253  Agencies are tasked with playing 
conflicting dual roles — they act as both support and service provider, 
and as prosecutor and enforcer.254  Resources are limited, and what 
resources exist generally have been poured into triage and foster care, 
while programs aimed at preventing the need for such crisis 
interventions are chronically underfunded.255  As the child welfare 
system currently exists, its focus is on identifying bad actors and 
families already in or approaching crisis, and intervening only at that 
point. 
 
 252. VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 8 (“[Predictive risk modeling] is a 
way of supplementing clinical decision-making.  By offering clinicians a risk score 
that stratifies that the patient is at long term risk of, for example, readmission to 
hospital, the clinicians could be alerted to looking at the wider context of patient’s 
situation than simply the current medical crisis that brought the patient to the 
attention of the clinician.  Similarly, targeting the PRM on long arc-risk complements 
the role of the screening staff who are focused on the information about the 
allegation contained in the referral.”). 
 253. See Garrison, supra note 53, at 5. 
 254. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 255. See Vivek Sankaran, Is the Solution Really for More Children to Enter Foster 
Care?, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE  (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-2/is-solution-really-more-children-
entering-foster-care [https://perma.cc/2E3B-AR7Q] (“[T]he United States has never 
provided adequate funds to support effective prevention programs.  Recently, Dr. 
Jerry Milner, associate commissioner at the Children’s Bureau, stated that the federal 
government spends approximately $6 billion on foster care, yet it only spends $83 
million on prevention programs.  We know these underfunded programs can safely 
keep children with their families.  For example, studies have documented the 
effectiveness of programs like Families First, in which families get resources and 
support to keep children in their care.  A study done by Dr. Sacha Klein, a social 
work professor at Michigan State University, found that Head Start was effective in 
reducing the need for foster care placements.  And another study found that raising 
the minimum wage by just $1 reduced the number of referrals to child welfare 
agencies by nearly 10 percent.”). 
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This system stands in stark contrast to public health efforts that 
truly strive for prevention.  Public health workers “also investigate 
risks[, b]ut they do so with a focus on populations and conditions 
instead of individuals; their aim is not to categorize or prosecute, but 
instead to identify the circumstances associated with adverse health 
consequences so that those circumstances can be altered.”256  
Understanding the limitations of importing predictive models 
developed in prevention-oriented contexts onto the child welfare 
system is vital to ensuring that algorithms are not misused in the child 
welfare sphere. 
2. The Human Role 
Predictive analytic tools can be wrong, they can be biased, and they 
may fit poorly within the existing decisional frameworks our system 
demands.  And yet, despite these many shortcomings, humans tend to 
imbue machines with outsize authority.  This phenomenon has been 
called “automation bias.”257  Seeing automated systems as 
authoritative and neutral, users tend to be “less likely to search for 
information that would contradict a computer-generated system” and 
to “rely on automated decisions even when they suspect system 
malfunction.”258  In criminal contexts, it is reported that judges find it 
“very hard . . . to go against [an automated] risk assessment program 
because it’s couched in science.”259 
Where predictive analytic tools enter into the child welfare 
decision tree, we should be wary of the power of automation bias.  
Call center workers, social workers, case workers, and judges may 
“over-credit the reliability of machine-generated risk scores or, in 
extreme cases, begin to make decisions” about important questions 
such as whether to remove a child with blind reliance on the risk 
score.260  This danger is especially salient in times of foster care panic, 
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when decision-makers are operating under the intense “cover their 
ass” mentalities that prevail in these crises.261 
Early anecdotal evidence from the Allegheny County experiment 
shows that automation bias may already be having an effect on the 
way call center workers incorporate information gleaned from 
repeated use of the AFST.  According to Eubanks’s description, the 
developers of the AFST appear to have built a safeguard against 
automation bias into their system, requiring call center workers to 
lock in their own risk assessments based on their review of the 
family’s information before they click on the “big blue button” to 
generate the AFST score.262  After that time, only a manager may 
change the recommendation.263  Despite this attempted safeguard, 
there is evidence that automation bias is having an effect.  According 
to Virginia Eubanks, even experienced call center workers have 
asked to change their risk assessments after reviewing the score 
turned out by the AFST.264  Allegheny County Intake Manager Jessie 
Schemm stated: “If you get a report and you do all the research, and 
then you run the score and your research doesn’t match the score, 
typically, there’s something you’re missing.  You have to back-piece 
the puzzle.”265  This may be automation bias in action. 
Additionally, automation bias may have effects that last beyond 
the moment of decision.  As call center workers interpret risk scores 
over time and compare AFST results to their own judgments in case 
after case, the algorithm may influence the workers, fundamentally 
altering the way they assess reports.266 
IV. PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Predictive analytics are the result of numerous human choices, 
reflecting the fundamental unresolved problems in our existing child 
welfare system.  They may be inaccurate, not only working off of 
flawed data but also weighting the various types of error and risk to 
families in ways that do not comport with community values.  
Predictive algorithms may be infected by, and may even magnify, the 
same faulty assumptions and biases that created and perpetuate a 
system that disproportionally affects poor families of color.  They may 
 
 261. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 262. See EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY, supra note 154, at 141–42. 
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 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 141. 
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use data without the consent of their subjects, even where we might 
believe consent is necessary.  They may be misused, importing long-
term, amorphous risk predictions into decisions that must be about 
imminent risk.  And they may do all of this with an air of authority 
that they do not warrant. 
Even so, agencies continue their efforts to implement predictive 
analytics.  In fact, the federal government is poised to throw its weight 
behind the development of these tools — in June 2018, Senator Todd 
Young of Indiana introduced a bill in the United States Senate that, if 
enacted, would allocate ten million dollars for a pilot program to fund 
up to five tribal, local, or state governments as they develop new 
predictive analytics tools.267 
Acknowledging that efforts to implement predictive algorithms 
into child welfare systems are likely to continue, what can be done to 
ensure these tools are developed responsibly and in line with 
community values?  This Article makes four preliminary 
recommendations that should serve as a baseline for any responsible 
implementation of predictive analytics in child welfare.  First, these 
tools must be developed in the most transparent manner possible.  
Second, enforceable legal constraints must be placed on their use.  
Third, strategies to confront and correct bias must be put in place.  
And fourth, communities considering implementation of predictive 
analytics should use this moment as an opportunity to build better, 
more humane, and values-driven child welfare systems, focusing more 
on support and prevention, and less on too-little, too-late targeting 
and crisis intervention. 
A. Prioritize Transparency 
Developing a predictive algorithm requires a multitude of parties 
to make myriad value-laden decisions.  Agency personnel, data 
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analysts and coders may all have a hand in development and may 
make choices that impact the lives of children and families.  For this 
reason, it is vital that communities have oversight of, and input into, 
the process of deciding whether and how to create and implement 
predictive tools.  To accomplish this, agencies and governments 
embarking on a predictive analytics project must ensure that the 
process is transparent and open at every stage. 
One level of transparency would include making the source code 
and details of the algorithm itself open to the public.  This is not a 
radical thought, but is common practice in the technology world.268  
Some of the most secure digital tools are peer reviewed and open in 
this way — what the industry calls “open source.”269  This practice 
ensures that tools remain honest, reliable, and are constantly 
improving.270  Where predictive tools are developed by entities 
outside of government, insisting on this type of transparency is likely 
to be particularly fraught because companies may attempt to assert 
trade secrets protections.  Wherever possible, government agencies 
should insist in their contracting processes that the code be open, and 
that the contracting party maintains the burden of identifying any 
information for which protections can be asserted.  States and 
municipalities can also take action to mandate that all algorithms be 
open source, through laws or regulations.271 
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Although there is value in ensuring that the underlying code is 
open, access to the code itself is not the only way to achieve 
meaningful transparency; in fact, such access might not be of much 
help in some cases.272  The code can be complex, and may be difficult 
to understand or impossible to interpret without the proper training 
and knowledge.  In order to achieve meaningful oversight, 
communities will have to ensure that the choices made during 
development are documented with accessible, plain-language 
materials that explain the reasoning behind, and the effects of, the 
many decisions made.  It is important to ensure that this information 
is documented in a form that is accessible to the relevant audiences 
such as the general public and specific, affected communities.273 
Special attention also must be paid to the information that is 
provided to users of the system.  In order to combat over-reliance on 
predictive tools, ignorance of their limitations, and the effects of 
automation bias, users may need to understand the pathway that the 
algorithm took to reach its conclusion, be trained specifically on the 
meaning of any score or result, and appreciate the technology’s 
limitations.274 
Finally, the validity, reliability, and real-world functionality of the 
tool must continually be studied.  This includes both pre-validation 
and post-implementation studies, regularly performed by 
independent, outside groups.  Further, these studies must then be 
made available to the public in the same plain language style as 
development process decisions, so that affected communities can 
assess any “disparate impact” the tool may be having.275 
B. Create Enforceable Legal Constraints and Guidance 
Legislatures ought to put in place clear, enforceable legal rules to 
limit how predictive tools are used, and to guide users in employing 
these tools in line with community values.  This will ensure that 
predictive tools are developed and operated with transparency and 
with appropriate consideration for their limitations.  Even where 
communities may approve of the actions taken by a certain official or 
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feel that the agency is developing the tool responsibly — as may be 
the case in Allegheny County, for example — concrete rules are 
important in the event of mission creep or a change in leadership.276 
In the case of child protective algorithms, it is important to set 
limits that will guide the many aspects of these tools that can run wild 
without proper protections.  These include when and how these tools 
can be used, what they can be used to model, what information they 
can access, who should have access to their scores or outcomes, and 
what individuals can do if they feel that erroneous information is 
utilized, their consent was not adequately sought, or they are treated 
unfairly as a result of the algorithm. 
It is of particular importance to set limits on when and how 
predictive tools can be used to inform child protective decisions.  As 
established above, predictive algorithms cannot foresee risk on a 
specific, individual level, and their predictions lack the appropriate 
level of “imminence” to inform removal decisions.  Therefore, these 
tools should be excluded by enforceable legal rules from removal 
decisions.  Legislation or regulations barring agencies from employing 
algorithmic prediction as part of their removal decisions, given the 
current state of the science, are a start. 
C. Confront Bias 
Although predictive analytic tools are touted for their bias-
reducing potential, they will not reach this potential without 
concerted efforts of developers and oversight from agencies and 
communities.  As this Article has shown, without careful attention 
these tools run the risk of magnifying the effects of existing biases, 
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while simultaneously clouding visibility into their impact.  When 
agencies and communities consider utilizing a predictive tool, 
therefore, they must focus efforts on reducing the effects of bias in 
their data sets, tool design, and implementation.  This means 
interrogating the data set being used to feed the tool for sources of 
bias, paying careful attention to the choice of variables included, and 
closely monitoring any possible disparate impacts of the tool’s 
predictions. 
As discussed above, particular attention must be paid to the effect 
of protected variables such as race.277  For this reason, some scholars 
have advocated that tool developers should treat protected attributes 
“with great care,” but that they should “not eliminate them from the 
dataset.”278  Instead, they should, where possible, seek to “capture 
these variables” and study how the risk model treats them in order to 
monitor, and attempt to correct, any systemic biases in the data or in 
the tool’s implementation of the relevant program.279 
D. Focus on Prevention 
As this Article has established, predictive analytic tools are not 
magic wands generated out of pure science.  Machines are not moral.  
They do not implement their own value judgments, nor will they save 
us from our flaws.  These tools are, instead, expressions of human 
opinion and policy.280  Understanding this leads to a final point: 
agencies or communities attempting to implement data-driven 
predictive tools must approach these efforts with a keen eye for the 
values they seek to further. 
The policy goals of child protective efforts are many: to prevent 
child maltreatment, to direct resources to where they are needed, to 
support families in crisis, and to avoid unnecessary family break-ups.  
Where agencies consider attempting to harness the power of 
predictive analytics, they should gear their efforts toward areas where 
the capabilities of predictive analytics align with the goals for which 
they are being employed.  Instead of trying to shoehorn predictive 
tools into decisions machines are ill-equipped to make, agencies 
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should embrace the public health origins of these tools and use them 
for population-based prediction or “opportunity mapping,” guided by 
a drive toward prevention.281 
Child protective efforts to date have often been overly focused on 
triage, resulting in a system that is reactive instead of prevention-
focused.282  There is, however, evidence that the Titanic of child 
welfare is turning ever so slowly toward prevention.  In 2018, for 
example, the federal government enacted the Family First Prevention 
Act, which in part made federal funds that previously funded foster 
care available for preventive services such as mental health and 
substance abuse prevention and treatment services.283  And in 
November 2018, the Children’s Bureau issued an information 
memorandum to “strongly encourage” child protective agencies to 
focus more on preventive efforts.284 
Where agencies shift focus to improve prevention as opposed to 
crisis intervention, predictive tools can be used to amplify these 
efforts.  For instance, agencies might use predictive analytics to map 
the communities where families are likely to be in need of services 
and direct additional resources to those communities, instead of 
attempting to target a particular family once it already is in crisis.285 
CONCLUSION 
There are clear flaws in the way our child welfare system makes 
decisions.  These flaws must be addressed, and perhaps technology is 
one route to doing that.  There are, however, serious risks posed by 
predictive analytic tools.  To guard against these risks, we must be 
cognizant of the many value-laden human decisions that go into the 
development of these tools and ensure that those whose lives are 
affected by them have a meaningful seat at the table as they are 
considered or developed. 
Algorithms will not fix child welfare. If introduced, they will be 
tools employed by and in service of a system that is itself riddled with 
flaws.  Until we take effective action to address the underlying 
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problems that truly lead to the disproportionality, unfair treatment, 
and backwards functioning of our system, we will simply be coding 
over the cracks in its foundation. 
